South-East Asian

SPECTRUM

U. OF ILL. LIBRARY

Volume 2, No 2 January 1974



The South-East Asian Guerrilla after Detente

Seeing South-East Asia from the Sea

Counter-Insurgency Thinking since 1947

Peking, Kuala Lumpur and the Chinese Minority in Malaysia

Organizing Counter-Insurgency: The Thai Experience

SPECTRUM

Volume 2, No 2 January 1974

Contents:

Page:

THE REGION
The South-East Asian Guerrilla after Detente 1
by Dennis J. Duncanson

LAW OF THE SEA
Seeing South-East Asia from the Sea 12
by George G. Thomson

COUNTER – INSURGENCY
Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Thinking since 1947 21
by Geoffrey Fairbairn

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE
Peking, Kuala Lumpur and the Chinese Minority in Malaysia... 36
by Goh Cheng Teik

THAILAND
Organizing Counter-Insurgency: The Thai Experience 45
by Justus M. van der Kroef

Notes on Contributors 55

Published by the –

South-East Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO Headquarters, P.O. Box 517, Bangkok, Thailand.

"South-East Asian SPECTRUM" is published under the authority of the Secretary-General of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. Articles do not necessarily represent the views of the Organization or of individual governments. Unless otherwise expressly stated all articles and statements may be reproduced. Articles may only be reproduced with the author's name.

SPECTRUM

THE REGION: *"The price of freedom in South-East Asia is redoubled vigilance over the rural guerrilla", Dennis Duncanson told a recent gathering of rural security and development experts; "detente, like Beauty in the proverb, is in the eye of the beholder". The following article is an edited version of his speech, delivered at a Home-Defence seminar hosted by the Republic of the Philippines and attended by representatives of countries faced with common problems of village security and development.*

The South-East Asian Guerrilla after Detente

Dennis J. Duncanson

HOW has *detente* affected the destiny of the South-East Asian guerrilla? Will he figure more or less conspicuously in the regional politics of the future?

The termination of the US bombing in Cambodia on 15 August has been an event of perhaps greater significance than the cease-fires in South Vietnam and Laos. This judgement is based on the fact that the cease-fires were brought about by the President of the US and consequently are the fruit of calculated policy, whereas the bombing was terminated by resolution of the Congress of the US and was therefore, almost by definition, emotional and uncalculated. The strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link; the strength of a democracy is the fickleness of its public opinion, not the resoluteness of its leadership. Today, not only in the US but throughout the free world, there is a wave of pacifism, coupled with an intuitive belief that demobilization from the cold war is both desirable and safe, even at the cost of the principles for which the cold war was embarked on. President Nixon himself initiated the *rapprochement* between the US on one hand and People's China and the Soviet Union on the other which is the essence of *detente;* but he was responding to a wish of his electors. When he acquiesced in an end to the bombing, he condemned the policy as misguided. His true feelings probably come close to those of the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, when he addressed the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Ottawa on 2 August: "War between the super-Powers," Mr. Heath said, "is now less likely. But their very reluctance to get involved increases uncertainty in the rest of the world—increases the risk of *local* conflicts." Mr. Heath's warning is both justified and important.

In combating the Communist struggle for power, people in South-East Asia can no more ignore the international dimension than the Communists do themselves. This article will therefore start with some observations on the wish, and justifications, for *detente* in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America, as countries subject to considerable mutual influence through their Press and intellectual exchanges. The second section will try to define long-range aims in the Communist world and to discern how the various ruling Communist Parties view *detente.* Next comes a discussion on the place of South-East Asian insurgencies in this new balance of power; and fourthly a forecast is hazarded about the tactics for winning power which Communists are likely to apply in the immediate future.

* * * * * * *

AT the back of everybody's mind in the West is the spectre of the H-bomb and the armoury of nuclear weapons; the first step in

detente was the successful negotiation between Washington and Moscow of the Test Ban Treaty. The shadow of the H-bomb has long lain over big-power involvement with insurgencies, especially in the South-East Asian region; the fear has been that, if the nuclear powers became too closely committed to any particular conflict among smaller powers, matters might end by their attacking one another with "the ultimate weapon". This fear is evidenced by the leadership of the Soviet Union too, but in the West it is felt by leadership and public equally; in Russia there is no public discussion, and the public only has the merest fraction of the general knowledge available in open societies. There is consequently a stronger incentive in the West to sacrifice other interests and ideals in bargains to avert nuclear tension than in the Soviet Union. The West has a denser population and vaster material resources at risk in the feared holocaust.

In 1947, the seating of Communist Parties in power in the countries of eastern Europe conquered by Hitler and liberated by the Red Army spurred President Truman to enunciate his famous doctrine: if these territories were used as bases from which to launch insurgent movements led by Communist Parties in neighbouring countries, like Greece, the US would rally militarily to the defence of the victims. Whether Truman had the A-bomb in mind he was careful not to say-there was already widespread horror over its use even against Japan. The question whether his doctrine might extend to American military action to unseat the Communist Parties already Installed by the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, as a belt of satellites, received a final negative answer as soon as Moscow developed her own A-bomb: her possession of a nuclear capability henceforward guaranteed her an undisturbed sphere of influence in Europe. When the Truman doctrine was given an Asian dimension in response to the Zhdanov doctrine of "national liberation" (which will discussed in the next section) the question arose whether nuclear weapons might be used to halt Ho Chi Minh in those days, public opinion in the US would almost certainly have endorsed such action, but the White House, and America's allies, feared Russian retaliation, so they were not used. In the Cuban missile crisis, we saw a reversal of roles: Khrushchev, having bought up Fidel Castro and his freelance rebel regime, tried to breach America's traditional policy of excluding other major powers from the western hemisphere. That Cuba lay within the US sphere of influence, irrespectively of its government's ideological alignment, was reaffirmed in President Kennedy's expressed readiness to push the nuclear button against Moscow. Today, People's China has achieved a nuclear capability and can, thereby, reaffirm a traditional sphere of influence of her own in mainland South-East Asia. The violent vituperation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which on one hand may seem to weaken Communist solidarity, opens up on the other fresh peril of conflict capable of erupting into nuclear war. It has therefore become imperative for the country with most to lose from nuclear war, the US, to seek *detente* with China; China's price is American withdrawal from Indochina. In a sense, the independence of Cambodia may turn out to be the first victim of China's H-bomb.

All this, in the *backs* of people's minds in the West, prompts them to demand that South-East Asian defence be left to South-East Asians; if in some future South-East Asian conflict President Nixon contemplated honouring his whittled-down Guam version of the Truman doctrine, by intervening in a clearcut cross-frontier invasion, he would encounter strong, perhaps overwhelming, opposition in Congress. It is to be doubted whether his successor, whoever he may be, will feel bound by the Guam Declaration at all.

There are further considerations in the *forefronts* of people's minds, tending in the same direction. Firstly, from the American point of view, how long was military intervention supposed to go on? Regardless of whether General Westmoreland pursued the wrong or the right strategy, the US lost through it 50,000 men killed alone, and it was the fear of young conscripts that they were going to be among them that was the root cause of the popular revulsion against the war after the Tet offensive in 1968. Alliances for mutual defence between States can well be permanent—the Anglo-Portuguese one has endured for 600 years—but only on a contingency basis, as a deterrent to aggressors: once the aggressor has attacked, it is assumed that the war will be of limited duration; no State could ever undertake to fight a permanent war on behalf of another. So, one may deplore the motives for some of the stages of American withdrawal from Indochina,

but one can hardly question the principle of with-drawal itself. This second consideration affects only the other three of the former colonial powers of South-East Asia, France, Netherlands, and Britain: it is their resentment at American suggestions that they should make sacrifices, in men or treasure, in defence of an independence which is under attack, in part, because, as they see it, they were hurried off the scene. Resentment has been most marked in the case of France (even de Gaulle seemed to prefer that Indochina should fall to Communist arms than that it should be saved by America). Resentment has been very slight in Britain, but if ever she were appealed to for a renewal of her military commitment on the scale of ten years ago, it would certainly be more in evidence.

A third consideration at work is the affluence which has taken root, in recent years, in the societies of Western Europe and of North America. The West today has a greater vested interest in peace than ever, and in the public mind peace gets confused with pacifism and appeasement. There has been much specious argument from Press and campus to prove that South-East Asians ought to give up their resistance to the imposition on them of the totalitarian, collectivized, State sponsored by Russia and China because their resistance threatens world peace; "peace" here is a hypocritical sublimation of Western affluence. In some churches in England, weekly collections are taken for transmission to the Vietcong, who are bent on banishing the practice of religion from Indochina. This self-styled "liberal" attitude to *detente* and local conflicts originated on one hand from the traditional standpoint of the Press, and on the other from uncomprehending disgust over the conduct of the Vietnam war. It is generally accepted in the West that the prime duty of the Press is to pick holes in government policy, and although there has been plenty of sensible comment on the politics of South-East Asia in the more intellectual Press of most countries over the years, the cumulative impact of television has been to emphasize the shortcomings of South-East Asians engaged in defending themselves; unintellectual audiences infer simplistically that those attacking them must be good. What might be called detractions from due process of parliamentary democracy, commonplace all over South-East Asia, have often been exaggerated by the Press, their causes frequently falsified, with encouragement from the international Communist movement, whose propaganda machine is very active all the time; unsophisticated sections of the free-world public—and that includes much of the intelligentsia—unable to grasp that an authoritarian regime may be a lot less oppressive than a totalitarian one, have concluded that there was nothing *worth* championing in South-East Asia, if to do so detracted from *detente* with Russia and China. It is not surprising, the argument has continued, that American military intervention in Vietnam should have failed in its objective of deterring Hanoi from aggression: the humiliating outcome has been a providential chastisement for lining up with one of two contestants equally wicked, or even with the wrong side altogether.

The quest for *detente* thus has rational justification, but its pace has been set by a largely irrational public opinion, and its effect probably reduced thereby, if not nullified in the long run. People's China has, for her part, neither modified her nuclear policy nor made any other real concession.

* * * * * * *

WHAT we need to consider, rather than that, however, is whether *detente* has earned any concessions by People's China, or the Soviet Union, on the insurgency front. The true cause, in my opinion, of America's inability to deter Communist aggression in Indochina has been the fact that she dared not escalate punitive air strikes on Tonkin to the point of endangering the Communist regime itself: if the Allies were able to knock out the Axis with air power in the second World War, the reason was that they were free to overthrow the *governments* of Mussolini, Hitler, and Tojo. President Johnson, on the contrary, was obliged, so as to obviate the risk of Chinese or Russian intervention (which *might* have turned nuclear), to promise explicitly that he would stop the bombing short of causing the collapse of Ho Chi Minh's government in North Vietnam (DRV); if the US Air Force really had bombed the Tonkin dykes last year, the object of American intervention *would* have been attained, but China's sphere of influence would have been breached, with unpredictable consequences.

The Communist States are unwilling to halt their use of force until they get some international guarantee to confirm the permanent rule of Communist Parties over the peoples their armed struggle has captured; what has been up for decision in every cold-war conflict has been the political future of adjacent free-world territories—Communist territories are inviolable. In a nutshell, the basis of Communist strategy is the domino theory. The vast home territories of both Communist super-Powers are in any case safe from the kind of military invasion that Hitler and Tojo embarked on; what they *would* have to fear if they were not protected by a belt of satellites and a sphere of influence would be penetration of their iron, or bamboo, curtains by ideas inimical to Communist rule. One could argue from this situation that, nowadays, it is the Communist countries who hold the nuclear pistol to *our* heads, not the US to theirs.

A Communist application of the domino theory was implicit in the Zhdanov doctrine of 1947, which first proclaimed the existence of "two blocs" throughout the world, the capitalist and the Communist, locked in irresolvable conflict until the day when the Communist bloc would overthrow the capitalist bloc. This was the declaration of the "cold war". But what Zhdanov was urging was an old idea: it went back to the strategy of the Communist International formulated in the early 1920s. Lenin believed (erroneously) that the political economy of western Europe was dependent on raw materials and trading profits from Asia to such an extent that revolutions in Asia would cause unemployment in Europe and facilitate Communist takeovers there. This belief was written into the slogan "national liberation" and couched in terms of economics and social justice of universal application. However, that the object behind "world revolution", first under Lenin and later under Stalin, was establishment of a monopoly of power is borne out by two facts: first, before 1939, the Comintern took no interest whatever in Africa, where alone outright colonial regimes were established; and second, whenever economic and social-justice reforms were introduced in Asian territories, notably India but also South-East Asia, under non-Communist auspices, Communists struggled violently, on instructions from Moscow, to wreck them. Ho Chi Minh, it is endlessly repeated, was concerned only with national emancipation; yet he wrecked French plans for a conference on self-government in Indochina in 1931 and presided over the assassination of every non-Communist nationalist leader of note his men could lay their hands on in 1945. Zhdanov's restatement of "national liberation" at the founding of the Cominform in 1947 is to be understood as a return to that policy after the interlude of the second World War when Stalin had had to renounce the aim of world revolution (and wind up the Comintern) temporarily for the sake of the anti-fascist alliance: Zhdanov rededicated the Soviet Union to ensuring that the succession to colonial power should pass to Communist Parties exclusively and for all time.

In the earliest Bolshevik vision, the end result of world revolution was to be the establishment of a single Soviet state, gradually embracing (domino-wise) every country in the world and ruling in the name of "international proletarianism". Later, for practical reasons, Stalin redefined this vision as "socialism in single countries"; he accepted that there would be a multiplicity of States, superficially independent, but each would be ruled by a Communist Party which itself would be subject to Comintern direction and audit. Even today, in all Communist countries, the top man in the table of precedence is the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, the second the Prime Minister, and the titular Head of State comes third. "National liberation", from Zhdanov's lips, conjured all that up again, and that there had still been no change of intention twenty years later came through with Brezhnev's promulgation of the "limited sovereignty" of the nominally-independent Communist States of eastern Europe during the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968.

Has *detente* brought any Russian retreat from the Zhdanov doctrine? In 1971, *Kommunist*, the theoretical periodical of the Soviet Communist Party, published an article by one Ponomarev on the world revolutionary process since *detente*. According to this exposition of the new situation, the relaxation of world tension has not contributed in any way to reconciling the capitalist and Communist blocs; instead it has strengthened the Communist bloc at the expense of the capitalist bloc and, to that degree, enhanced the opportunities for "national liberation". "Communist Parties," Ponomarev added, "were,

are, and will remain a necessary force for the revolutionary development of the national-liberation zone"—a sentence that could have been taken directly from the minutes of the Comintern Congress of 1928. In other words, in Soviet planning, *detente* is a tactical manoeuvre on the road to the same triumphant goal as ever; Soviet diplomats, if taxed about their country's foreign policy, will reply that there has been no abandonment of national liberation or of international proletarianism, while the Soviet Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* is full day by day of the same truth. As for China, the theme of "national liberation" has been blared out every day over *Radio Peking;* most significantly when President Nixon visited the Great Within in February 1972, the joint communique proclaiming that Sino-American *detente* specifically reserved China's position over "wars of national liberation." Only in regard to timescale has moderation crept into Chinese and Russian thinking; in 1919, Lenin expected the whole world to fall into the grasp of the Communist movement within two or three years; in 1947, Zhdanov appeared to believe he was proclaiming a final struggle, even if it was going to take a decade or two, while the People's Republic of China, newly inaugurated in 1949, plainly counted on the dominoes in Korea and Indochina, and perhaps Malaya, falling quite swiftly into her orbit when the colonial powers went home; today the Communist apocalypse, though still felt to be a certainty, is assigned by all Communists to an indefinite future.

A more radical change in today's situation, of course, is that Communist power in China has led to polycentrism. Polycentrism takes two forms, with a bearing on each other; one is the emergence of Peking as a rival source of doctrine for the international Communist movement, and the other is the proliferation of guerrilla movements in different parts of the world seeking power by Comintern methods but not necessarily acknowledging the discipline of either Moscow or Peking.

To take proliferation first, it is outside this article's scope to review all the independent guerrilla movements throughout the world beyond saying there are scores of them now, by no means all left-wing ones; in Northern Ireland, for example, there are two anti-Communist movements (one Catholic) and one pro-Communist (also Catholic), but the latter has been in league with one of the former against the other. In parts of the Middle East and Latin America people live under constant threat of terrorists all the more frightening because nobody knows who they are or what they want. What is important is the attitude of Russia and China to guerrilla movements they have not launched themselves.

Generally speaking, both super-powers give comfort,aid, and diplomatic support when called for to *any* body of "freedom fighters", irrespective of their ideology or of the support the other is giving. In Europe, for all that various Anarchist and Trotskyist groups of the so-called New Left are ideologically anathema to Moscow and Peking, they are quietly helped by Moscow or Peking-oriented Communist Parties in any disruptive activity they are willing to undertake. The explanation is that any movement which has a damaging effect on the capitalist system and on national defence arrangements against Communist aggression is considered worth encouraging; in addition, there is always a chance that the movement can be brought to heel in the long run. The most spectacular example was Cuba: Castro did not start off a Communist, but after seizing power declared himself to be one in response to Russian and Chinese offers of aid. There is no doubt a lesson here for South-East Asia, where the numerous independent groups in Burma receive at a minimum radio encouragement from China.

In fact, it seems to me that the Sino-Soviet dispute has not been a noticeable set-back for national liberation, despite its leading to splits in some of the South-East Asian Communist Parties—or perhaps to providing a rationale for jealousies between leaders already at loggerheads. True, there has sometimes been a tendency for Moscow to work through governments, while Peking was aiding guerrillas. One example was Indonesia a dozen years ago, another is Cambodia at the present time (November 1973). But these are to be interpreted as complementary methods for seating Communist Parties in power, and in the most important case of all, that of the Vietnamese Party, there has been active collaboration almost throughout the "protracted war".

In any event, two conclusions can be drawn.

First, rivalry between Moscow and Peking, far from being exploitable as a Leninist contradiction by interests outside the Communist world, has resulted, and must be expected to go on resulting, in mutual emulation rather than mutual frustration, because neither super-Power can afford to be the one which lets down a fraternal Communist Party. The second conclusion is that, if the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) now led by Le Duan, *were* so lucky as to triumph in the end, it would inevitably grow into a third Communist focus of power in relation to South-East Asia, but would not, for that reason, become "Titoist": so far as the free world is concerned, and the domino strategy for promotion of national liberation, the ICP would fit into a hierarchy of relations, midway between its neighbours and the Communist nuclear powers—one corresponding to its historical position between its neighbours and Imperial China. This opinion is supported by several public statements by no less an authority than Prince Norodom Sihanouk. It is salutary to remember that the word "fraternal", so beloved of the Bolsheviks and their successors, implies equality in Europe, but inequality in Asia.

* * * * * * *

AND yet—paradoxically perhaps—it is virtually certain that there will be no more Vietnams in South-East Asia; career prospects are not good for a young South-East Asian if he chooses to be a guerrilla today. It is not that the South-East Asian guerrilla's prospects are diminished since *detente* by any abatement of the Russian and Chinese goal of world revolution; but he is being superseded as the leading agent for establishing communist power, and henceforward must be content with an ancillary role. In the first place, there is the time factor: the Maoists (New People's Army—NPA) in Central Luzon are obviously not now going to conquer Philippines stage by stage, if the *Hukbalahaps* were unable to do so two decades ago, from easier beginnings; a Chin Peng (the leader of the Malayan Communist Party), who could not coerce Kuala Lumpur into submission from as near as Kajang is never going to do so from as far away as Betong. Until two or three years ago, the Vietcong school for guerrillas at Hoa Binh was known to be training hilltribesmen from a belt of territory stretching across Laos and Burma to Nagaland in India and with links to the Naxalites in West Bengal; they seemed to be threatening Indian security in the interest of People's China. But the school lost its foreign students when American bombing intensified, the Naxalites fizzled out, and India's action—supported by the Soviet Union—in wresting Bangladesh from Pakistan has deprived the hilltribe guerrillas of their strategic usefulness.

The nearest approach to a guerrilla success story in South-East Asia has been the Vietcong's. However, not only were its origins unique and unrepeatable, but it has so escalated that its weaponry depends on conventional command structure and sources of supply. It has outgrown the protracted warfare of Mao Tse-tung's Long March and moved into a higher stage of political strategy. This higher stage is formalized in the January cease-fire: the cease-fire has drawn a firm political line between the contending forces, repugnant to the operational requirements of the guerrilla, though not so to the infiltrating assassin; the degree to which the latter is able to intimidate the target population is the greater for the overtness with which the expeditionary force from the DRV stands on its side of the line brandishing its conventional weaponry. The new strategy conforms to a new social situation in South Vietnam, where half the population is now said to be urbanized, and even farmers have transferred their homes to the little towns. In the controversy over revolutionary method which has divided Russians and Chinese since about 1934—is the proletariat the best tool for seizing power or is the peasantry?—a partial swing back to the Russian doctrine is going on, and the Chinese themselves are being influenced by it. Although the implications of this change can be exaggerated, there is significance in the liquidation in China of Lin Piao, chief exponent of "using the countryside to encircle the towns." Both the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its termination have been very complicated historical events, and one of the factors behind its termination was plainly to facilitate *detente* with the US; but the guerrilla question was another. In the domestic policy of People's China, egalitarian "voluntarism" is giving way again to incentives to labour, and many China-watchers await daily the rehabilitation of Liu Shao-ch'i; as usual, the DRV similarly is talking about incentives again and once more setting "expertness" above "redness". The consequences of this change for revolutionary

tactics will be discussed in the last section of this article.

In terms of strategy, a reasonable forecast is that the next few years will see the South-East Asian Communists pursuing positive objectives only in, or through, Indochina; elsewhere in the region their objectives will be of a holding or negative kind. They will be concerned cautiously to consolidate their hold over all of Indochina before they make any further domino-type advance on the mainland, even in Thailand; in the rest of the region—where they have suffered a long series of set-backs to put them on their guard against rash advances—"peaceful coexistence" will be the order of the day.

Consolidation in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is going to be slow work. To remain a credible power, the DRV has to reinforce its economic base at home, by improved production in both agriculture and industry; American as well as Russian aid may help, but the workers are tired of supreme efforts and recalcitrant to "labour discipline" (hence the return to incentives). In South Vietnam, the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" ("born in Paris", not Vietnam, it is now admitted in Hanoi) has to be given a reality it has lacked totally so far, despite the diplomatic recognition granted to it by countries like Sweden. Attempts will be made to equip it with a public administration and social services to which notabilities from the government side can be invited on inspection visits, so as to make it appear a viable, if not a desirable, alternative to the present elected government. Everything possible will be done at the same time to make life difficult for the government and to discredit it abroad and at home. If and when the provisions of the January cease-fire are put into effect, and elections held for a unified government in South Vietnam, the Communists can be expected to insist on arrangements which leave them undisputed masters of the territory on their side of the cease-fire line: the sharing of power, under whatever formula, will be confined to the government's side of that line, in accordance with the domino principle that, once under Communist rule, land and people must so remain for good.

The strategy can be observed in action already in Laos; there the Pathet Lao is firmly entrenched, with North Vietnamese advisers, technicians, and managers, on its side of the cease-fire line, whilst the Royal government has to accept a token occupying force and share power with the Pathet Lao on the other side of it. Even if the coalition government in Laos is allowed to open offices in Sam Neua, there is no question of sharing in administration of Pathet-Lao territory; most of the latter has been under ICP rule continuously since it was first invaded by Giap's guerrillas in 1953, and it would no doubt present practical difficulties to unscramble the enforced social changes, even if Hanoi were agreeable. The North Vietnamese leaders will probably not wish to displace the coalition government altogether because they will need to sustain the insurgency in Thailand's North-East; it is more tactful to infiltrate agents through a narrow belt of country nominally not under Hanoi's control than through territory for which the Pathet Lao is formally answerable.

In Cambodia similarly, if the guerrillas captured Phnom Penh, two zones would emerge: the frontier districts long under the Vietcong would stay so, whilst a coalition government would be set up in the capital. The Cambodian Communists are unorganized; it would be a long time before Hanoi could trust them to take over the administration, and so control will have to be exercised for the time being through some non-Communist puppet like Sihanouk. All the Communist Parties of Indochina, naturally, are branches anyway of the ICP, in the same way as the ICP itself was once a branch of the Comintern.

Outside Indochina, China will in the first place continue her present efforts to establish diplomatic relations wherever she can in South-East Asia and staff her diplomatic missions with agents, Russian-fashion, to provide tacit moral support to local Communists, including guerrillas in those countries where an insurgency already exists. The DRV will follow suit. Both governments have already dropped their subversive broadcasts to South-East Asia on the regular wavelengths of their transmitters, in deference to *detente,* but China continues her anti-government broadcasts to Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma, notably in minority languages, in the name of rebel groups not supposed to be under control.

Such duplicity of relations is likely to mark "peaceful coexistence" at all times, but Burma

probably has little more aggression than that to fear from China or the DRV now; the endemic chaos of her provinces neutralizes her as a frontier threat to China, and her domestic and foreign policies keep her economy in a state of under-development. It is probable that neither of Burma's Communist Parties, hard to distinguish from traditional bandits, could be installed as a government anyway without intervention from China to help it, and that would be tactless after *detente,* as well as a threat to India, now supported by the Soviet Union.

Communist strategy in Thailand appears to have been concentrating primarily on undermining the position of the American forces in the Thai military bases and on bleeding away resources needed for national development and social progress. The scattered insurgencies in different parts of Thailand will undoubtedly continue to be built up as a form of pressure to frustrate the central government, in the hope that its present resoluteness against Communist purposes on the international stage may eventually waver. The precedent of the short-lived Greater Thailand campaign from China, before the Bandung Conference in 1955, is a warning that the DRV might one day (say, five or six years from now), foster irredentist claims against Thailand in the name of Laos, limited at first perhaps to a campaign for the autonomy of the North-East, not for its own sake, but as a means of coercing the Bangkok government into changes of leadership and policy desired by Hanoi.

Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia are too far from Indochina to undergo direct domino effects—that is, infiltration of guerrillas—from the consolidation of Communist power there; no knight's moves are practicable in this game of chess. Moreover, the settlement patterns of all four countries, and the advanced tenor of life of the first three, year by year militate more and more against starting up the continental type of guerrilla warfare. The probabilities are that Communist Parties will be instructed to Europeanize themselves—i.e. to prepare themselves to work subversively within the constitutional system the way they do in the West rather than from guerrilla bases outside it. This change of emphasis is well documented in regard to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), and there are indications of it in the Philippines; it implies inauguration of forms of struggle which the young German activist, Rudi Dutschke, has quaintly dubbed "the long march through the institutions".

Guerrillas already in the field in Malaysia and Philippines will certainly not be demobilized; they will be used as one of several tools for weakening and pressuring governments. At the same time, wherever there are shaky allegiances to the central government—Sabah, Mindanao, and so on—the Communist Parties will go on exploiting every opportunity to back up, overtly and covertly, secessionary tendencies; when the time seems ripe, China or Russia, either directly or through the DRV or North Korea (if these are admitted to the UN, as is likely) can be expected to mobilize sympathy in the international Press for the autonomy of would-be Bangladeshes in the region, and to stir up hostility against Manila and Kuala Lumpur among the more gullible members of the General Assembly; Malaysia has already suffered this treatment before, in 1963-4. At this point, of course, discussion enters the realms of conjecture, the more so because it is hard to predict either the moves of extraneous powers like Japan or the effects of Sino-Soviet rivalry in novel circumstances, such as eventual development of Communist naval power and a resultant wish of either super-Power to dominate South-East Asian *waters* or monopolize the technical facilities of Singapore. But here too, as in the case of Indochina, neither China nor Russia will work against the rise of a Communist Party supported by the other merely because it is not its exclusive puppet.

* * * * * * *

THE tactics and behaviour which Communists have pursued in all circumstances hitherto and which they show no sign of relinquishing now, *detente* or no *detente,* form a vast subject, but some generalizations are in order.

The quality which permeates, more than any other every Communist policy and deed, is deceit. There is not a single example in history of a Communist Party canvassing the masses for support by describing to them the collectivized, totalitarian, permanently one-party, State it proposed to set up. Lenin was contemptuous of would-be Communists who could not reconcile

themselves to placing "Socialist truth" above plain truth. Stalin repeatedly accused Britain and France between 1936 and 1939 of ganging up with Hitler to destroy the Soviet Union; yet it is now known, from captured German archives, that the Russo-German pact was only delayed until 1939 because Hitler's moral scruples prevented him for three years from responding to Stalin's repeated approaches to him. One is unlikely to find any statement by Ho Chi Minh, written or spoken, which was not palpably intended to mislead; he evinced great pleasure at being believed. There is nothing to which Communist Parties react with greater violence than to being unmasked; deceit is precious to their cause.

It is fashionable to assert—especially in the aftermath of *detente*—that the part played by fear in the Communist system has been exaggerated. Yet there has not been Communist Party which, during its revolutionary period, has not made and held recruits by blackmail, and the practice of holding kangaroo courts is widespread in Communist-dominated trade unions in Western countries. As soon as power has been seized, the chances are that more blood will be spilt in cautionary executions to cow the captive masses than was spilt in seizing it: in Russia, during the fifty years before the Revolution, 25,000 people at the outside estimate lost their lives in political struggles of all kinds, whereas in the fifty years after the Revolution a minimum of a million and a quarter did; in China the disproportion was less, but still not fewer than two million were executed by Communist Party kangaroo courts between 1949 and 1952; in Vietnam, the so-called land reform claimed possibly 100,000 lives—enough for Ho Chi Minh to be moved by the public outcry to apologize. The Khmers Rouges have already carried out indiscriminate killings in the districts of Cambodia they have captured; it is not surprising that voices are heard in Saigon predicting a bloodbath there too if Hanoi took over. Obviously, one does not necessarily save one's skin by surrendering; this conclusion gives an extra dimension to Mr. Heath's observation about the effect of *detente* on local conflicts.

Then there are what can be called the social factors in revolution. It is commonly believed that the basis of support for Communist Parties is the promise of redress for some widespread grievance; on the contrary there is a long record in South-East Asia, as elsewhere, of Communist sabotage of reforms. Communist Parties have tried to harness to their purpose *all* the social factors influencing the life of individuals or groups—what is right with society as well as what is wrong. The patient study of village life by agents in disguise to discover what Lenin called "contradictions" is chronicled in intelligence reports all over South-East Asia. Students failing their examinations have found a new outlet in the Party; family and village ties have drawn in others; youthful aggressiveness, ambition, and love of adventure have posed as social idealism—and so too have more middle-aged vices like greed and envy. The scope for this kind of social manipulation is actually greater in towns and under conditions of industrialization than in the guerrilla's rural habitat. The fast-developing urbanization, in Malaysia and The Philippines especially, opens up new opportunities which the Communists appear to be already exploiting. Backsliders are deterred by blackmail or punished by assassination.

That leads to a fourth generalization: that all Communist planning is a combination of legal with illegal action; indeed, in the 1920s and '30s, the Comintern would not accept a Communist Party for affiliation unless its leaders promised that they were ready to undertake illegal (which meant criminal, not just politically-banned) action, for that was regarded as the main path to power, legal action subordinate to it and requiring simply to provide cover for it. The urban terrorist, using legal organizations for cover, can be harder to unearth than the rural terrorist operating from a guerrilla base and therefore exposing himself every so often to interception.

Nonetheless although the rural guerrilla is no longer cut out for the lofty destiny of Mao Tse-tung's Long March, his capacity for tactical sabotage is absolutely unimpaired; if he were not dealt with but left to get out of control, in any particular country, that very success might purchase him a new lease of life in international Communist planning. Ho Chi Minh's switches of tactics between Bolshevism and people's war, as well as the time-honoured Communist practice of never letting any weapon in the armoury go rusty, should put South-East Asian governments on their guard. Conversely, if the tables can be turned against the guerrilla, preferably by penetrating his organization as he penetrates that of

his target, every other sector of the Communist movement will tend to be discredited by his defeat; and that can be counted on to have a beneficial impact on all forms of lawlessness in vogue. Successes against guerrillas will therefore help in combating the main Communist thrust for the time being in South-East Asia, the one within the constitutional system—Dutschke's "long march through the institutions."

Ever since Bolshevik times, the international movement has been alive to the necessity to have a sophisticated and reliable Party on hand before any putsch for power is contemplated. Indochina has possessed such a Party for a long time, but in other countries the process of what the Vietnamese call "bringing the Party to maturity" from the present state of affairs is going to take several years. Although other South-East Asian Communist Parties claim to be just as old as the ICP, none of them has enjoyed true continuity, and their present leaders—even of the MCP—are untried. In Indonesia, the CP has been in disarray ever since the "Gestapu", attempt to seize power in 1965. Undoubtedly, we are on the threshold of a period of "Party-building" it is quite explicit in the documents of the MCP: that is to say, weeding out of unpromising members and training of the elite for political tasks rather than military ones. The cadres will gain their experience in action, the purpose of which, incident by incident, will be to weaken the material and moral position of the authorities and meanwhile to impress the masses with consciousness of the Communist Party's Mafia-like presence, unseen, as a force more formidable than it may really be, capable of striking unexpectedly whomever it wishes, and to be reckoned with ultimately as an alternative to the present system of government. In Vietnam, the message will be that the Communist Party is not far away in the DRV and PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government—Viet Cong) districts, but omnipresent, the moment of its inevitable takeover close at hand.

Since no non-Communist government in South-East Asia tolerates a legal Communist Party, the legal aspect of Communist activity can only be located within the guise of other organisms. Simultaneously with the reduction in status of the guerrilla, today the demise of the Communist-sponsored "front" too appears at hand; instead, Communists will join and try to dominate existing organizations. Translated once again into Bolshevik terminology, the "bloc without" technique will give way to the "bloc within"—as happened several times during the lifetime of the Comintern. Naturally, this does not mean that where Communist Parties *are* legal and exist as a "bloc without", "bloc within" is not practised at the same time; in England, forty years ago, Arthur MacManus explained that he had joined the Labour Party, along with other Communists, the better to destroy it when it was elected to office. In the 1920s, Communists set up an international front, the Berlin-based League against Imperialism, one of whose duties was to procure legal defence for Communist agents in trouble with the authorities; Ho Chi Minh was co-founder of the China branch. But experience taught Communist lawyers, like the celebrated D.N. Pritt in London, that they were better placed to help agents in the Far East—men like Ho Chi Minh and Tan Malaka—if they acted outside such fronts, ostensibly with professional detachment. These examples of subversion are doubly significant if the contention is correct and South-East Asian Communist Parties are going to emulate European tactics rather than Chinese ones under the new conditions.

There is no field of social, economic, or political activity which can be regarded as immune to subversion; in fact, subversion has to be well-nigh universal before it can succeed. Communists cannot afford to neglect any organ within the constitutional system, just as their guerrillas dare not leave any village unpenetrated: there is not just a danger of missing opportunities, but any unpenetrated institution will become, however unconsciously, an obstacle in their path. In the Republic of Vietnam subversion will be quite blatant if the political provisions of the cease-fire are put into effect: there will be overt Communist candidates for election and covert candidates, posing not necessarily as neutralists, but under more innocuous labels as well, especially among *emigres* brought back from France. Throughout South-East Asia, the parliamentary process should be treated as exposed to penetration in this manner, and not solely from within self-proclaimed left-wing parties like the Barisan Socialis Party in Singapore or the Party Rakyat in Malaysia.

The Press is particularly vulnerable to subversion in an open society, and in no sphere is

the effect more immediate and potentially far-reaching.

The security forces and the civil service are obvious targets, but also difficult ones for the Communists. Most vulnerable, and most useful for pressuring governments, are on one hand schools and universities, on the other labour unions; all of these provide broad oceans for the fish to swim in, enormously reducing the cadre's risk of detection, whilst government retaliation against abuse of such institutions is almost unavoidably indiscriminate and can consequently be represented as a tyrannical attack on education in general or on industrial action by workers in general. A university has particular advantages for a Communist Party, both as a field of recruitment and as a tool for wrecking: the young are not so much idealistic as prone to hatred; though swift to act antagonistically, they lack commonsense and are actually rather uncritical; and thirdly there is a new generation of them every three or four years, so that the mass can be discarded and contact maintained only with a select few.

The upsurge, throughout the free world, of discussion of social problems, already affecting South-East Asia, provides fresh opportunities for Communist propagandists to cajole intellectuals—the "deaf-mutes" as Lenin contemptuously called them when discussing how to exploit their susceptibilities—into solidarity with supposedly "good causes" whose true object is to undermine the constitutional system; treatment of convicted criminals and agitation for abolition of death sentences are examples.

Labour unions offer different advantages, of which the chief is the damage to the national economy that can be wrought by manipulating them. There is unlikely to be any reversion to the old "General Labour Union" technique of the MCP, to which the Communist label is easy for the government to attach, but rather the infiltration, and likely capture, of unions founded by other hands and therefore not suspect to the general public. It is usually easy to mobilize students to riot in support of strikes.

Another foreseeable danger as time goes on, is that, if the rural insurgencies are not suppressed in good time, there will be more frequent co-ordinated campaigns of struggle, involving both town and country simultaneously. Movement between urban and rural party cells is likely to grow more common; it has always been so in The Philippines, and the "worker-peasant alliance" is today dear to Communist theorists. This re-emphasizes a truth useful in understanding the present state of the world revolution: although national liberation in South-East Asia, if it is victorious, must serve primarily the strategic interests of China, it is mainly the more sophisticated methods of Russia that are likely to be followed to that end. But that is becoming increasingly true of the domestic policy of China herself, in the declining period of Mao Tse-tung's rule.

LAW OF THE SEA: *Looking towards the full-scale international conference on the Law of the Sea planned for later this year, this article highlights the immense potential for enrichment offerred by a joint exploitation by South-East Asian countries of the surrounding seas.*



Seeing South-East Asia from the Sea

George G. Thomson

TO see the world from the vantage point of the moon as an astronaut sees and photographs the world is to see a small overcrowded, self-polluting spaceship in an expanding universe. This is not a new truth for the earth-bound; but a new perspective on the truth. Similarly for the land-bound, instead of looking from the land to a marginal and peripheral sea, to look from the sea to a marginal and peripheral land, will establish a new perspective on, and therefore perception of, the truth. This change of perspective is no academic "Let us suppose for the purpose of argument". It is a perspective on the future, for Man may well be at the turning point between the territorial phase of man's history and his maritime phase. A crowded world cannot treat the oceans which form 71 per cent of the earth's surface as waste land; or of so little value that it can be left as common land of a low priority of interest. Man is being forced to sea for transport, food, raw materials, for a *glacis* of offence or defence; and, if modern architects are given their head, for living space. And, as mankind is not one community of one mind, but the 135 different, if not divergent, minds of the membership of the United Nations, the world may face a sea-grab as great as the land-grab of imperialism of the 19th century, but with more contenders, and more visible and audible contenders, in the sensitive world of mass, world-wide instant communication.

The sea is not a new factor in history. The world economy has been built along sea-lanes. More empires of longer duration were built by sea than by the land appetite of a Napoleon or of a Genghiz Khan. States like Venice and Sri Vijaya with small territories were able to build great power by their contemporary standards. Naval battles have been no less crucial than land battles. The Battle of Trafalgar was of crucial importance for Asia, because the Britain in whose body economic the Industrial Revolution was born, could, unimpeded, take her products to, or force her products on, every country of the world accessible by sea. Sea-open countries far outnumber the land-locked or in the new vocabulary, the shelf-locked. The Battle of the Straits of Tsushima ensured for the Japanese absence of naval limitation to their power in the immediate environment of East Asia.

But as the old world has been changed by territorial implosions within countries and not naval explosions outward, and as the new economies of the newly created or re-created States continue to rely on external shipping interests, new maritime lobbies concerned with the sea, and the new national interests which will be deployed in the Conference on the Sea-bed planned for Santiago in 1974, are only of recent emergence. Phrases like the freedom of the seas are relevant in an imperial climate of marine navigation, but have no place in an international climate of the economic exploitation of marine and submarine resources. As wealth means trade which is predominantly sea-borne, and re-

sources, a growing proportion of which particularly for developing countries poor in land resources are marine resources, the problems of the sea are central and integral and no longer marginal and peripheral. The great majority of international problems will have a maritime dimension, without the analysis of which the problem is imperfectly stated and therefore can only be inadequately resolved.

* * * * * * * *

THESE generalizations are of no less relevance in South-East Asia, the two largest States of which are archipelagoes with a total of 8,000 islands, large and small. The coast-line of the Philippines is longer than that of the U.S.A. West Malaysia's sea frontier is four times longer than her land frontier. Again the dominant features of South-East Asian geography are her majestic, fertile, delta-creating rivers, the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam Chao Phya, the Mekong and the Red River; and men who live on rivers look downward to the sea and not upward to their sources in the mountains. Men came by sea in search of the wealth of South-East Asia, and by sea the resources were exported.

Historically, the movements of people which brought the majority of the people to and through Malaysia were by sea. Melanesians, Polynesians and Indonesians passed through South-East Asia. "Perhaps" wrote Dr Coedes, a pioneer of South-East Asian early history, "it was the call of the sea which acted as stimulus"; and Formosa, the Philippines and Indonesia were on the route of these migrations. "One thing", he says, "is certain ..that in prehistoric times, communication by sea existed between the peninsula and the islands, but also between India and the whole of South-East Asia". The "barangay", the name of the basic Filipino social unit, literally means a boat, with the "datuk" as the captain. Each kin-group sailed into a river mouth and there transformed the community of the ship into the community of agriculture. As Dr J.C. van Leur, another pioneer historian wrote: "Sailing will undoubtedly have played an important role in the organization of the colonization and providing means of subsistence". The seas of South-East Asia were bustling with traders at the same time as the Mediterranean of the Phoenicians and the Imperial Romans. When the Europeans came to Asia by sea they entered a trade pattern at least 1400 years old, and again to quote van Leur, "in the 16th century Portuguese trade was exceeded many times by the trade carried on by Chinese, Japanese, Siamese, Javanese, Indians and Arabs". Sri Vijaya which based its power on its ships is described by van Leur as "a coastal state, a commercial power and sea power lying open on the river close to the sea, basing its might and wealth on the stapling of the international trade of South-East Asia, an expansive maritime power". In 1017 the Maharajah of Sri Vijaya in a letter to the Sung Emperor described himself as "King of the Ocean Lands". The Chinese have traditionally thought in terms of one ocean stretching from South China to the Mediterranean. And the traditional description of the Chinese in South-East Asia is "Nanyang" or South Seas.

The Spaniards came to Manila as an entrepot particularly for Chinese goods; and Singapore, a catalyst for South-East Asian commerce and a way station on the route to China, was described a year after its foundation in terms which have their contemporary relevance: "Merchants of all descriptions are collecting here so fast that nothing is heard in the shape of complaint but the want of more ground to build on."

The path of external political and economic power has been by sea. Indian traders, Brahmins and Chola ships of war came by sea. Chinese ships and the ships of Genghiz Khan came by sea. To use Stalin's division of nations into sea animals and land animals, Western Empire came as sea animals stealing up on the land animals of Asia. And when industrialized Empire sought markets and sources of raw materials again it built its highways on the sea. When the Japanese sought to bring South-East Asia within their "Co-prosperity Sphere," they came, and they came speedily, by sea. Their first targets were Pearl Harbour and Singapore, the two bases built after the Washington Treaty of 1922 to contain their oceanic thrust. It was by sea that the Americans were able to fight back in one of the most sustained naval campaigns of new tactics in the whole history of marine warfare. And just as the Germans signed their surrender on 11 November in a railway coach, it was symbolic that the Japanese signed their surrender on board an American battleship.

The major problems of the future are oceanic.

The Americans are retreating under the Guam doctrine from a position of Pacific dominance to a Guam base-line, further extended than the former Pearl Harbour base-line but nevertheless leaving a naval vacuum in the Western Pacific with no certainty yet of a successor, or of a policy of neutralization of these waters. Similarly in the Indian Ocean, the *Pax Britannica* is succeeded by a proposal for a Gandhian peace without power.

South-East Asian history has been shaped by its geographic position between two oceans rather than by its attachment to the Asian mainland. The Himalayan heights, the Tibetan plateau, and the deep ravines of Burma and Yunnan, have kept apart India and China, the world's largest countries with the longest continuity of culture. Trade was required to flow north of the barrier by land or south of the barrier by sea. It has been the rhythm of Chinese history that when the Northern route was closed by hostile forces it turned to the sea, as China is turning to the sea today because of the Russian control of the land route to the West. For those in the South of both States, the southward and seaward route was to be preferred for convenience and commerce.

Asia is the one continent with two oceans on one of its sides. Intra-Asian transport is inter-ocean transport. When the Asia of the Indian Ocean wishes to travel to or trade with, the Asia of the Pacific Ocean, the ships must pass through the straits of the South-East Asian archipelago, an Ancient Greek word modernly applicable to South-East Asia. Sea transport will grow in importance. Russia is attempting after its period of seclusion to become an area of transit by air, by road and by rail from the Western Pacific to Pakistan and the Arabian Sea, and to Europe. But the Chinese are not going to put all their eggs in Russian baskets, even when mobile. And in terms of cost and convenience apart from security, the outburst of ship-building technology, of which the Very Large Crude Carriers and the container ships are only the first-fruits, will attract more trade to the sea, at a time when the proliferating small national economies can only advance by exports, and exports by sea.

South-East Asia is a cornucopia of tropical produce and natural resources which even the chemistry of substitution cannot make redundant. Ancient Romans, mediaeval Europeans and Chinese, the modern industrial West have come to tap this cornucopia. They came by sea, a ready-made arterial highway for which they had only to provide the vehicles and not the upkeep of the highway. South-East Asia was accessible wealth, accessible to all who could build and navigate the ships to reach it. And the monsoons gave man natural power beyond human power and before mechanical power, to bring the ships to the heart of the monsoon area. Accessibility by sea is the *leitmotiv* of South-East Asia. If it had been land-locked like the Balkans of Europe, trade would have been tariff-trammelled; and the neighbouring Great Powers would be the unchallenged, self-appointed and self-interested guardians of their gates. But because of the sea, South-East Asia can trade and be traded with, through every ocean; and distant powers can come by sea perhaps to threaten, but also to balance.

* * * * * * * *

SOUTH-East Asia's relationship with the Great Powers is dominant in diplomatic and political thinking, with the withdrawal of the American forces from Vietnam, and with China's participation constitutionally in world affairs through the *detente* of mutual recognition and participation in the United Nations. But the channels of relationships are oceanic rather than territorial. It has been assumed that areas of power or spheres of influence are based on territorial adjacency, as Russian power is based in Eastern Europe. But South America in the 19th century after its anti-colonial revolutions fell within the British oceanic sphere of influence; and when it came under American influence again it was as part of an oceanic sphere, for there was no landward communication between the two parts of the American continent. Similarly it is assumed that as South-East Asia is territorially adjacent to China, a sphere of influence will inevitably grow in consequence. But China feels more threatened from the seas of South-East Asia than from its lands. And in the forward pursuit of her policies into the Indian Ocean, whether to trade or to neutralize a Russian influence which she sees as hostile to herself, or in pursuit of revolutions, it is the sea-routes of South-East Asia and not the land-routes which she is following. The pointers to Chinese strategic

and commercial policy are the ships she is building, buying or chartering. She wears her heart on a navy blue sleeve.

Similarly, neutralization must be an oceanic concept. The neutrality of land-locked Switzerland was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, by the Powers, great and small which had defeated Napoleonic France. Their purpose was to prevent it becoming the kind of power vacuum which power, like Nature abhors, and to remove temptation from a still distrusted France. But South-East Asia is not a land-locked area of limited access for transit. It is a maritime area of universal access and an oceanic cross-roads. Her seas are of greater international interest than her land. If South-East Asia had the same gargantuan shape of the similar southward land projections of South America and Africa, there would only have been interest in the possibility of a canal similar to the Panama or Suez Canals, or in the routes round its southern point; and that point, if Australia is according to the description of the present Australian Chief Justice Sir Garfield Barwick when he was Minister for External Affairs "the largest of the South-East Asian islands", would be to the South of Tasmania. The neutrality of a dead-end or a secondary road can be guaranteed; but how guarantee the neutrality in peace and war of an arterial route.

Moreover Switzerland's is an armed neutrality in military terms. Can South-East Asia arm navally to ensure the neutrality of her waterways? The recent announcement of the American Government that it intends to make more palpable its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and to demonstrate its right of way through the Straits of Malacca, pose the problem with ruthless realism. The re-statement of the problem in these terms does not make the answer easier to find or more congenial when found; but it makes the search for the answer worthwhile.

* * * * * * * * *

SOUTH-East Asia's economy has been determined by the sea. Its trade has been by convoys of ships rather than caravans of animals. It is the third largest source of tropical wealth in the world; but, if it is compared with the other two, the basins of the Amazon and the Congo, the distinctive feature of its accessibility emerges clearly. The thick jungle, the sultry climate, the lack of population of the Amazon basin delayed its development until recently; and the current development requires heavy investment in transport, in the transfer of people, and in the construction of new economic centres. Conditions in the Congo basin were similar with the added disadvantage of the rapids on the Congo which prevented access from the sea to the inland reaches of the river. In contrast, access to the riches of South-East Asia was by sea, an arterial highway built permanently by Nature without need for repair, allowing access from many directions and with mobility given by the monsoons allowing men to travel farther and faster than they could by the human power of oarsmen. Not only was their maritime access, through the area but *throughout* the area with its pattern of islands and peninsulas. This has been the rhythm of its economic history as the Ancient European world sought gold and scented oils; as mediaeval Europe sought spices, and mediaeval China sought scented woods and tin for its temples and rare foods for its tables; as modern industrialized Europe and America sought tin and rubber; and now timber-starved Japan seeks timber. South-East Asia has been the economic cynosure of the centuries.

The main surge of the world's appetite came in the form of colonial compulsions. Although the form has changed with the passing of the world of Western Empire, the appetite not only remains but becomes the greater as more countries develop the needs for raw materials, and as the appetites of the affluent become greater and more sophisticated. The richness and maritime accessibility of South-East Asia make the more urgent the problems of the too rapid depletion of the resources of the area, and of ensuring for the peoples of the region a fair share of the wealth their resources generate.

In a colonial context export suggests exploitation, and the sea is looked on as an open flank of economic weakness. But as the terms of trade are turning, and raw materials become scarce and their absence a source of weakness for the Great Economic Powers, as in the current energy crisis (November 1973), the multi-directional facility of trade by sea redounds to the advantage of the exporting countries. And the phrase, "the sea is neutral" takes on a new economic significance. Its advantages are open to those who have the strength and adaptability to use them.

There is a similar turning of the tide of advantage in the export of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. In the colonial setting, the sea brought the cheaper goods of the sophisticated and mass-producing economies of the industrial countries by the cheapest form of bulk maritime transport. Now the nations of South-East Asia seek the establishment and enlargement of the manufacturing sector of their national economies, established according to their own national interests as they see them. By sea they have access in bulk and with speed to the consumer-oriented affluent communities of the world. The outstanding example of this factor is Japan, which is the master-shipbuilder of the world, and has used its island position and its island-compulsions to turn the economic tables on the U.S.A. and on Europe.

Every phase of the development of the national economies of South-East Asia involves the growing dependence of the region on its maritime waterways. The limitations of "import substitution" as an economic horizon soon become apparent, and horizons are widened to "export-oriented" industries, with national advantage calculated in terms of "value added". If the new industries are based on the import of raw materials these can come most quickly by sea, without national boundaries to cross with the threats of tariffs or other discrimination on political or economic grounds, and without the delays in changing means of transport, e.g. from rail to ship, or in unloading and re-loading. Bulk carrying of raw materials and containerized carrying of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods is the future pattern of maritime transport, with the advantage over land transport. In the new flexibility of industrial investment, factories can be established not only adjacent to the raw materials or to the markets, but at any intermediate point where availability and cost of labour, or financial advantages in availability of local capital or tax concessions, or access to a regional market with a regional idiom, may seem of economic advantage to the firm. In the case of aluminium smelting, bauxite ores can be transported to sources of hydro-electric power. The fact that the phrase "off-shore" industries has entered our economic vocabulary rather than the phrase "extra-territorial", establishes it as an ocean-oriented concept. Similarly, particularly for South-East Asia, export-oriented is synonymous with sea-oriented. To gain the economies of mass production for the mass market, there must be the capacity to concentrate raw materials and to establish access to the mass markets. Oceanic transport can ensure both. While the proliferation of new nations has divided the world politically, economics seeks to widen the economic market, and the Multi-national Corporations are international conglomerates following the logic of a world economy; but only by oceanic transport can political restraints by intermediate areas of transit be minimized. Finally, the rewards of development whether in the form of profits or wages are seen predominantly in the power to purchase the artifacts of affluence, as conspicuously consumed in the developing countries, and displayed in their glossy magazines, their films and their radio and T.V. transcriptions. These artfacts arrive by sea transport.

The sea is no less important for the development of the national and regional markets of South-East Asia, the majority of whose populations live on islands. Ships are essential for the development of a national pattern of production and distribution in Indonesia and the Philippines. There is a parallel in the island-continent of Australia, 50 per cent of whose internal trade is carried by ship and whose development of the resources of her north-west shoulder, depended on sea transport. The development of the scenic attractions, the human skills and the material resources of the Outer Islands of Indonesia, or the Southern Islands ot the Philippines depends on the creation of regular efficient and cheap sea transport. In Vietnam, the port installations built by the American forces for the Vietnam war, may well in the building of an integrated economy between the two Vietnams be one of the most important economic spin-offs of the war.

During a seminar in Singapore in October 1973, Dr Sumitro, the Indonesian Minister for Research, urged the development of intra-regional trade, its urgency and its necessity. But this depends on the development of regional shipping services. Whether the ships will stimulate the trade, or the trade will follow the establishment of the shipping services, can be argued. But as the shipping services will be necessary at some not distant time, it seems better to accept financial losses in the first formative years so as to reap the certain profitability of the trade once it develops.

The advantages of maritime transport are multiplied by the technological revolution in ship-building, particularly with the development of the Very Large Cargo Carriers and of the container ships. 200,000 ton tankers are now taken for granted; two 480,000 ton tankers, owned by *Globtik* are now afloat and will carry 9 million tons of crude oil annually from the Gulf to Japan; and the 600,000 ton tankers are now on the drawing board. These are developments as great as those in the realm of larger aircraft. And the development of submarine freighters, faster in speed and smoother in transit, may well be the maritime equivalent of the supersonic jets. If these developments are to bring advantages to South-East Asia, there must be the port and repair facilities for the new forms and dimensions of shipping. Singapore already has berthing and unloading facilities for the large tankers and for the container ships, and is building two dry-docks for 400,000 ton ships in fulfilment of its role as the central port in an increasingly sea-conscious area. And with the development of port facilities in Port Swettenham and Johore Bahru in Western Malaysia and on Bataam Island in the North of the Rhio Archipelago, it is the area around and including Singapore, and not Singapore exclusively which will reap the advantages.

* * * * * * * * *

WITH the growing number and size of ships using South-East Asian waters, and the growing appreciation that the old phrase *Mare Nostrum* must be interpreted in a regional rather than a national sense, there arise the problems of alternative routes, of safety of transit, and of the ownership of the ships.

The most used route into and through South-East Asia historically has been the Straits of Malacca, for most of the navigation in the Indian Ocean was North of the Equator. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the straits of Malacca was part of the Grand Trunk Road of the Sea which came through the Mediterranean down the Red Sea to Aden across to Bombay, on to Colombo, Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo. It continues to be the shortest route between the two Asian Oceans, a matter of crucial concern for Japan, 80 per cent of whose fuel for its economic miracle comes from the Gulf. But with the prolonged closure of the Suez Canal, and the growing number of ships of a size which it could not accommodate, the route round the Cape of Good Hope has grown in importance. Ships sailing across the Southern Indian Ocean, the route of the Roaring Forties used by Dutch ships on their way to the then Dutch East Indies, can use the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra, or the Straits of Lombok to the East of Bali, and on through the Macassar Straits to China and Japan. And Indonesia has an interest in opening up this route by the provision of port facilities which do not yet exist. But these need not be alternative routes in terms of an "Either...Or". They can be complementary whether in terms of choice or congestion, and can be seminal in stimulating the growth of the economies of Eastern South-East Asia. Similarly, the building of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra which for the first time is being given feasibility status, will provide another route of convenience to some, and of compulsion to none. Whether it will add to the maritime strength of South-East Asia, or will divert strength from other areas will depend on the growth of South-East Asia's economy in terms of its imports and exports, and the areas in which that growth takes place. It would for instance be of more advantage to an expanding Vietnamese economy than to an expanding Indonesian economy.

* * * * * * * * *

THE problems of safety arise from the concentrated congestion of certain routes, the shallowness of much of the sea, the growing volume of oil as a cargo, and the growing size of the ships. A ship traverses the Straits of Malacca every 15 minutes of the day and night, an intensity of use only paralleled in the English Channel. Moreover the Straits are narrow. At the Southern end of the Straits, they are 20 miles wide; while the Straits of Singapore at their narrowest are 5 miles in width. Unless channels are clearly and fully marked by navigational aids, the dangers of collision are great. The waters are shallow and the sea bottom shifting. Already 200,000 ton tankers have scraped the sea bottom. The hydrographic survey, which is being carried out by the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore Governments and which began in November 1973, will be the basis for the new regulations for safe transit. The problem has been given escalation and urgency in the shadow of the *Torrey Canyon* with the

damage its oil slicks caused in South-West England, to fishing and tourist industries. No tanker has sprung a leak in its oil tanks in the Straits of Malacca, but a tanker which ran aground in Singapore demonstrated the damage which it could cause, and the financial cost of sea-cleansing measures. Such a slick in the Straits of Malacca would endanger fishing interests on both side of the Straits, with the political repercussions of the protests of the fishermen and the cost of remedial action. If submarine sources of oil are discovered, there is the added pollution which might come, as in the Gulf of Mexico, from faulty or damaged wells, or from seepage.

The problem of the Straits of Malacca is firmly on the international agenda and forecasts a fundamental re-thinking over the Law of the Sea as it was inherited from the 19th century in which the dominance of the seas reflected the political and industrial dominance of Europe. These issues will be defined and discussed at the Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1974 which was planned to take place in Santiago. With the probable extension of the width of territorial seas to 12 miles, the Straits of Malacca will cease to be international waters; and, if the archipelago principle* is accepted, as Indonesia and the Philippines insist it should be, the area in South-East Asia in which the freedom of the High Seas will be respected will be greatly shrunk. There is a basic conflict of problems; the interest of the countries of South-East Asia tnat their waters should continue to be waters of international transit; and their interest that they should be safe and unpolluted, and that their waters should not become an area of belligerence on issues in which they have no interest and wish no participation. The issues are tangled; but they cannot be resolved by the undiluted logic either of nationalism or internationalism. In the end the nations of the area must have the last word; for the Great, and slightly less than Great Powers cannot enforce their claims against the nations of the area. On the other hand, the region has its responsibilities to the international community and the world economy of which it is a part, and must use its powers sparingly and responsibly, not in terms of the question of who is conceding what to whom, but in terms of a question of the best balance of mutual advantage which can be struck.

* * * * * *

THIRDLY, the advantage of the sea is measured in terms of ships. Who controls the ships, of peace or of war, controls the seas.

---

*Editorial Note: *The "archipelago principle" was originally propounded by the Indonesian Government in a declaration of 13 December 1957. This purported to change the status of the waters within and around the Indonesian archipelago and read in part:*

> *That all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian State, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian State and, therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian State. Innocent passage of foreign ships in these internal waters is granted as long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sovereignty or security of Indonesia... The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.*

The provisions of this declaration were incorporated within municipal law on 18 February 1960. The need to strengthen the political integrity of the archipelago underlies the principle. In a 1970 publication, the Indonesian Department of Defence and Security stated that "the seas and the straits must be utilized to bridge the physical separation between the islands, regions and the manifold ethnic groups; this is also the case with our airspace." But the Indonesian Government also perceives the Malacca Straits issue as coming directly within the context of its archipelago outlook because the Straits provide a direct channel into the maritime interstices of Indonesia. Hence Indonesia's signature of a joint statement with Malaysia on 16 November 1971 that the Straits of Malacca (and Singapore) are not an international waterway.

Indonesia has made some progress in securing international recognition of the archipelago principle. At a meeting in Manila in May 1972 between its representatives and those of the Philippines and Fiji, an agreement was concluded setting out the "principles" for the assertion of sovereign rights over inland waters, sea-beds and air space by "archipelago States" and for the control over sea passages through such waters by foreign vessels.

See *Michael Leifer and Dolliver Nelson, "Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca",* International Affairs *(Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), April 1973.*

In general, shipping in Asia inertially reflects the shipping pattern of the era of European dominance, through the Shipping Conferences which reflect Western interests and conditions, and the maritime Trade Unions which limit the extent to which Asian nations can take competitive advantage of their cheaper labour costs. They represent one of the clearest cases of imported inflation of costs from Western countries. The questions are of control of routes and frequencies, the price of shipping space, the distribution of profits, the opportunities of employment for officers and men, and the creation (and the cost of creating) new routes, such as the trans-Pacific routes which must develop if the Pacific is to become a lake of mutual trading. There is therefore a policy of establishing national or regional shipping lines for internal regional and international shipping; and the heavy and growing dependence of South-East Asia on shipping should encourage South-East Asia to follow the example of Japan both in the direction of shipbuilding and of ship-running. Japan, as the Island-womb of its economic miracle, saw salvation only at sea, and more than insured its survival. By the same token South-East Asians could become the shippers of the Seven Seas with their own traditions of the seas. This need not be pursued in a spirit of exclusiveness, but of adjusted terms of accommodation, in terms of inter-dependence rather than the continuation of the present dependence. Already Singapore has successfully established its *Neptune Orient Line;* and shippers have sought the assistance of Chinese and Russian shipping to reduce its dependence. Malaysia and Indonesia have their own national shipping lines; but realizing that intra-regional competition in a posture of weakness will not redress the historic balance, ASEAN has set up a Committee actively to find faster and better ways ahead.

* * * * * * *

LOOKING ahead, South-East Asia cannot see its seas merely in terms of transit and transport. On an approximate calculation, 80 per cent of the area of South-East. Asia is sea; and as a look at the map shows, most of that area has the pale blue of waters of 100 fathoms or less, and the spot depths would suggest that for most of the area it is less than 50 fathoms in depth, much like the European North Sea. Mineral resources undoubtedly lie under these seas for nature made no distinction between sub-terrestrial and submarine constituents. They are of major importance for the long-term future of South-East Asia. Her seas may yet prove as rich as her lands. The prospectors for oil are the vanguard of this advance to the sea; but as the techniques of submarine mineral extraction develop, the richness will unfold, in a way which will ensure regional enrichment rather than extra-regional exploitation. Similarly South-East Asia's sea resources, whether in terms of fish or submarine agriculture, could make the phrase the "harvest of the seas" a literal rather than a metaphorical phrase. If man is moving from the stage of hunting fish to the phase of herding fish, as he moved from hunting animals to herding them, the shallower waters of South-East Asia could become piscine pastures both in terms of feeding and of capturing fish. The prospects may be long-term, but their promise should intensify research, if the new nations are not going to squander the natural resources over which they have resumed control.

South-East Asia must therefore look out on its waters not apprehensively, defensively and parochially; but creatively, confidently, and internationally. They are not maritime wastelands, nor space which is left in common because it is comparatively unproductive. They could be the richest reserve of resources of all the inherited richness of its land. They must not be viewed in the light of the political past but in the light of the technological future, whether in terms of shipping, fisheries or submarine mining. The development of what should be called, in a regional rather than a national sense, *Mare Nostrum,* provides an opportunity for regional economic co-operation in which the collective pronoun "We" becomes an operation rather than an aspiration. In the coming Age of the Oceans, mankind's biggest problem is the development of the resources of the sea by co-operation rather than conflict. And the American Government has already mooted the idea that the oceans should be developed under the aegis of the United Nations. South-East Asia under the auspices of a fully expanded ASEAN could make the pioneer pilot experiment in its own seas as to whether the ideals and institutions of such a policy can be realized. No area in the world with a maritime focus has such a degree of common interest as does South-East Asia. Across the Caribbean and the Mediterranean, the

developed North confronts the developing South; but the countries of South-East Asia face problems of development at similar stages and with similar problems. If therefore co-operation in harnessing the resources of the sea in the service of the peoples of the region cannot be realized in South-East Asia, it is difficult to see its being realized either in any other area, or globally, except in terms of a megalomaniacal Napoleonic domination. And if the nations of the area can develop these marine resources not only in their own regional interest but as the legitimate trustees for the area to our shrinking and over-crowded world, a new dimension of internationalism would be established in thought and in action.

COUNTER INSURGENCY: *Counter-insurgency theorists since the end of the Second World War can be categorized as Imperial pacifiers, doctrinaire replicators, doctrineless conservatives or Cold War liberals. The dilemma implicit in the replication of the methods of the Communist adversary in an insurgency situation (which the author argues has been the predominant feature of the campaign against the Vietcong) is that it militates against the very objective of the counter-insurgency operation - the preservation of a free society.*

Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Thinking since 1947

Geoffrey Fairbairn

"...the classic British view has paralleled the belief that schoolboys will always misbehave if not controlled by the schoolmaster... The problem of counter insurgency is merely that of strengthening social sanctions and developing the superego, which is likely to be particularly weak among less civilized and less technologically advanced peoples."(1)

"It is time for the army to cease being the *grande muette*. The time has come for the Free World, unless it wishes to die a violent death, to apply certain of its adversary's methods."(2)

"They have rejected the ideological historicism of their enemy, but they have not yet developed a systematic understanding of their own concerning the forces of history. It is not surprising, therefore, that CIA should have attracted to its ranks of expert interventionists especially the technician of power and the energetic but doctrineless conservative."(3)

"Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization. What is our reply to this historical conception and strategy?"(4)

THE promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which is widely held to have officially announced the beginning of the Cold War, was in part specifically related to the Greek insurgency. This insurgency was seen by President Truman as having regional and strategic significance. As he put it in his *Memoirs:* "It all seemed to add up to a planned move on the part of the Russians to get at least northern Iran under their control. Together with the threat of a Communist coup in Greece, this began to look like a giant pincers movement against the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean."(5)

There was thus built into American concern about Communist insurgency, at the very beginning, an international, if not necessarily global, concept of struggle. The rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine did indeed include the offer of help anywhere to governments faced "by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuge as

political infiltration" but as a strategic doctrine it appears to have been concerned with what was described as the "entire Middle East."(6) Moreover, the terms "coercion" and "political infiltration" clearly related to events in Eastern Europe and to what was accepted at the time as definite evidence of infiltration of guerrillas, arms, and supplies into Greece from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria.(7)

To the revisionist historian, David Horowitz, "...the Truman Doctrine of 1947 was...promulgated to deal with an issue that had deeper and more globally situated roots than the terms of the post war peace settlement in Europe, or the power conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the Truman Doctrine was promulgated to deal with *social revolution* in Greece, and Washington's open-ended commitment to suppress revolutions, which was expressed in the Doctrine, was obviously made also with an eye to the billions of dollars that the United States was then pouring into China in an unsuccessful effort to halt the advance of Communist revolution there."(8)

The writer believes that this view is deeply misconceived for a number of reasons that cannot be explored here: the state of American domestic politics; the U.S. stances actually taken towards the Greek and Chinese situations(9); the preoccupation with what was believed to be a politically aggressive Moscow policy; and American attitudes to de-colonization, not least in regard to the French return to Indo-China which in March 1947 had the support of the Communist Vice-Premier of France.(10)

However, the stress laid upon outside agency in the Greek Communist insurgency, and the fact that the crushing of the insurgency did coincide with a drying up of infiltration and outside aid, was undoubtedly important in the formulation of a global counter-insurgent doctrine in later years that laid excessive emphasis upon this facet of revolutionary warfare.(11) There was also noticed at the time, though probably less carefully, that the insurgency was Communist-led but composed of a "front" formed from people and groups of various political hues who were initially mobilized simply to fight foreign occupying forces. (12)

President Truman himself adumbrated the view that economic distress and administrative weaknesses were not only of signal importance in insurgency situations but required the presence of American advisers, civilian and military, if they were to be removed. Such advisers were not to be impeded in any way; nor were their efforts to be publicized by the governments in question and a guarantee of freedom for the American Press to play its role was written into the Agreement of Aid to Greece of 20 June 1947. Thus from the beginning of American counter-insurgent practice the prestige of the American Administration was laid on the line, and the Press was awarded a special role in this regard.

Finally, President Truman, in arguing that the Greek Government being supported "represents 85 per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election...(which) Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered...to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people", began a process of linking counter-insurgent support with the holding of elections in conditions that inevitably gave rise to a questioning of the fairness of the electoral process.

* * * *

HOWEVER, this did not amount to a counter-insurgent doctrine and the development of such a doctrine was of slow growth for a number of reasons. First, there was the fact of the Korean War being fought for the most part in a conventional, "limited", and not counter-insurgent fashion. Secondly, there was the emphasis laid upon a direct military threat in Europe. Thirdly, there was the overwhelming concern of American conflict experts with nuclear warfare problems. Fourthly, though SEATO, alone amongst American alliances, referred to the prevention or countering of "subversive activities directed from without against...territorial integrity and political stability" in Article II, this was for some time rendered seemingly pointless by the coincidental promulgation of the "massive retaliation" doctrine. Fifthly, though not always adequately noticed, it was not until 1958 that Americans "finally" lost their "conviction of their own military omnipotence"(13), which at first naturally resulted in yet more thought about the weapons systems. Sixthly, though the 1950s saw an often febrile debate about why the U.S.A. had "lost"

China to Communist revolutionary warfare, the debate was couched in oddly domestic terms. It was not, finally, until the time of President Kennedy, who was deeply influenced by certain advisers, aware of the futility of massive retaliation, wishing to take up a special stance, and confronted by what he saw as a (Khrushchevian) doctrine of "Liberation Warfare", that counter-insurgent doctrine became a centrally important, globally orientated matter of State in U.S.A.

The peculiar circumstances of that time will be discussed below. But it is necessary, in this writer's view, to notice that in 1947 there was established the CIA, staffed by men Manfred Halpern has described as being for the most part "hard-working, intelligent, imaginative and courageous far above the average of men", even if doctrinelessly conservative. It seems fairly clear that this organization has been very important indeed not only in developing concepts of clandestine operations but also in much more generalized ways. As to the former, it was the first chief, Allen Dulles, who pointed out that whereas the Truman Doctrine had offered aid to governments believing their "free institutions and national integrity" were threatened by "Communist subversion", if such governments should *ask* for aid, it was also necessary to pre-empt clandestinely a Communist subversive take-over bid whether the government asked for such activity or not.(14)

This was done successfully in Iran and Guatemala.(15) Presumably with the permission of the Philippines Government, a CIA team assisted in the putting down of the Huk insurgency, and it was later moved to South Vietnam as part of the Saigon Military Mission on 1 June 1954.(16) But this meshing with the US military on that level was only one of the relevant activities of the CIA, which according to Dulles, had been given by the National Security Act of 1947 "a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government of the world."(17)

The CIA, which under President Kennedy took a major part in fashioning a general counter insurgent stance,(18) gradually developed a body of counter-insurgent theory that is highly unlikely to have been developed by the U.S. armed forces. Its clandestine activities began a process of estranging the Press from the Administration,(19) which in turn led to the alleged kind of Administration deviousness widely believed to have been exposed by the *Pentagon Papers* in regard to involvement in Vietnam. Its organization was globally orientated in an intimate and open-ended manner — "They know they are engaged in a cold war without foreseeable end", as Halpern put it — foreign to the armed services; and this resulted in the building up, through the media, of a world-picture highly favourable to the enlargement of what came to be called, on occasion, "counter-insurgent doctrine."

This is not to draw a picture of departmental empire-building without reference to foreign realities. From 1949 onwards Peking propaganda, later taken up by Khrushchev, doubtless because of Sino-Russian rivalry, emphasized *ad nauseam* the central role of revolutionary insurgency throughout the Third World. The Calcutta Conference of Communist Parties early in 1948 and the Peking Trade Union Conference of November 1949 appeared to many at the time as proof of a concerted Communist attack on the non-Communist world, much of it by way of revolutionary insurgency.(20)

A widespread view was expressed in the British Labour Party's *Problems of Foreign Policy* published in 1952:

> The Soviet Union seemed to see the chaos caused by the war not as a challenge to co-operation but as an invitation to expansion. In defence *(sic)* of wartime agreements it imposed Stalinist regimes... It used starvation as a weapon of expansion against the people of Berlin and sought to do so throughout Western Europe by urging its Communist fifth columns to sabotage production. It supported armed revolt against the legal governments of friendly countries — sometimes reactionary governments like those of Greece and Indo-China, sometimes progressive Socialist governments like those of Burma and Indonesia. It supported aggression by one State against another in Korea.(21)

* * * *

BUT it was chiefly out of the Indo-Chinese experience that there arose the first Western attempt systematically to analyse revolutionary warfare and on the basis of that analysis to fashion a doctrine for the countering of that kind of warfare. Though this school of French theorists was doubtless psychologically "motivated" by the Indo-Chinese defeat, and in

some cases by humiliations felt in captivity — and motivated also perhaps by a desire to assert a superior politico-military understanding against the dominant American school of thermo-nuclear warfare strategists(22) — it did set about formulating the doctrine in a rigorous, if somewhat narrowly conceived, manner (i.e. narrowly conceived as to the investigation of such matters as "nationalism" in Algeria, very widely conceived in strategic terms).

The kind of warfare to which an answer was being sought was defined thus by Colonel Roger Trinquier: "Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions — political, economic, psychological, military — that aims at the *overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.* To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked — ideological, social, religious, economic — any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day inter-dependence of nations, any residual grievances within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world conflict."(23)

Though there were certain individual differences of emphasis, these theorists of modern warfare, as Trinquier called it, were generally disposed to see the problem primarily in terms of psychological manipulation(24), authoritarian organizational skills, and international conspiracy. The doctrine was both clinical in its approach to what was seen as a pathological condition and fervidly Eurocentric in its attitudes towards the demoniac and barbaric elements it perceived in revolutionary insurgent leadership.

To defend certain ill-defined values of the West, the French school sought in effect to replicate the methods, on various planes of organized activity, of the enemy who had defeated the French army in Indo-China. It is scarcely too fanciful to suggest that the military who believed in this doctrine saw the re-indoctrinated officers and n.c.o's of the French Army in Algeria as the Party and cadres of a new movement designed to protect the "traditional values of the Occident against a neo-Islam erupting out of the Orient".(25)

And yet part of the exercise was also to refurbish the moral stance and national stature of the French Army itself. As General Navarre, who was not of this company, put it in regard to Indo-China, "If, finally, there was a lack of enthusiasm, it was because France had never known how to tell her soldiers what they were being asked to die for".(26) In future the Army itself had to be the medium of the message it alone had received from the struggle in Vietnam. There, "the Viet Minh Army was dynamic because it was young...enduring because it was recruited from among the peasant masses and lived in materially extremely tough conditions. It was fanatical because of its political education, which both preceded and accompanied the military instruction, inculcating a solid ideological faith and a fierce hatred of its adversary. It lived amongst the people; it was supported by them; but at the same time it compelled their full participation in the war".(27)

Coolly accepting that "In modern warfare, as in the traditional wars of the past, it is absolutely necessary to make use of all the weapons the enemy employs", the French school of theorists, who were very much a minority in the French Army, set about destroying the "armed clandestine organization". This organization was nationalist not Communist, though employing many of the organizational and tactical modes of Communist revolutionary warfare, by way of a pyramidal-structured mobilizing of the people — building from the base up, *a la* the Communist — while harassing the anyway badly co-ordinated armed bands and using what were called "special methods" to crack the terrorist underground.

Regroupment of the population and what is now known widely as "civic action" was also an essential part of the campaign, it being fully realized that control, physical and psychological, over the masses was in part achieved through the exploitation of social "contradictions". Though some of the theorists believed that terrorism was the most effective manner of securing popular support, something that was regarded as seldom being of a spontaneous nature,(28) they drew upon the imperial tradition of pacification in regard to constructive measures — as did the British in Malaya and the Americans in the US Marine Tactical Area of Responsibility in the Second Indo-China War.

On the level of control, the French pacification was undoubtedly impressive,(29) but this was achieved only at very great cost.(30) The peculiarities of what was in some ways France's Ulster make it difficult to generalize from this struggle in terms of counter-insurgent theory. However, certain points stand out very clearly. First, however temporarily efficacious counter-revolutionary strategy and tactics may have been, they were throughout at the mercy of the French State, that despised *pays legal,* which towards the end of the Algerian struggle was taken over by a former soldier who showed that in withdrawing from Algeria he represented a post-colonial France. For the revolutionary warfare theorists to have been permanently successful they would have had politically to encadre and indoctrinate the conscripts and radically alter the character of the government of France.

Secondly, and much more importantly for counter-insurgent thought in general, was the fact that the struggle waged by the doctrinaires not only showed that France itself would have had to become monolithic, and be "reinforced eventually by an equally monolithic West" if the struggle were endlessly to be protracted in North African and colonial terms; it also showed that an attempt to replicate the enemy's politico-military strategy, albeit imperfectly in point of ideology, engendered a cast of mind and a mode of behaviour subversive of Western values.(31)

Nevertheless, this French approach does illuminate an issue that has never been satisfactorily resolved in counter-insurgent theory and practice. It was put very clearly by an American theorist, John J. McCuen, who devoted a great deal of attention to the struggles in Indo-China and Algeria:

> Conduct of counter-revolutionary warfare is a highly complex operation, requiring the unification of diverse agencies, interests, and concepts. Unifying the effort is the last, but by no means the least, principle of counter-revolutionary warfare. It is the most discussed but least understood and practised principle of them all. It is perhaps in this area that the revolutionaries have developed the decisive superiority which has allowed them to win so many of their struggles. The problem is that the democratic system is based on the separation of powers... Yet the conduct of counter-revolutionary warfare requires unification ...at every level. The problem is how to achieve unification without destroying the very freedom that the government is seeking to preserve. (32)

* * * *

THE British theorists doubtless would claim that they showed in Malaya how the problem could be resolved satisfactorily(33); and so long as they continue to refrain from considering Cyprus where the same methods had very different consequences, no doubt they will retain their position of lofty eminence in counter-insurgent thinking.(34) The British approach, as exemplified by their most notable practitioner and clearest expositor, Sir Robert Thompson, is believed to be the product of a long tradition of imperial pacification, in which patience, determination, and an offensive spirit tempered by discretion, displayed by men using their commonsense and keeping their feet on the ground "at the right time and in the right place will win."(35)

And on a certain level, and in a particular manner that is often misunderstood, this tradition did win in Malaya but not really on the level of "winning hearts and minds"(36), and certainly not in the manner of cutting the ground from under the Malayan Communist Party's claim to be fighting for independence and (people's) democracy. Thompson spelt out the meaning of the victory in Malaya, many years later, in terms that deserve careful consideration:

> An aim must be positive and constructive, not negative and destructive, and represent the final object of the war... I would, therefore, put it something like this: "To establish a South Vietnam which is free, united, independent, politically stable and economically expanding"...The aim should dictate policy and strategy, and any action which is not consistent with this aim can then be recognized for what it is — a contribution to defeat. It was the achievement of this aim as a whole, little understood as it was at the time, which secured victory in Malaya, not, as so many people have assumed, just the fostering of democracy and the granting of independence. The latter were consequences of the achievement of the aim. They represented a risk, not because the Malayans were unprepared for them, but because they meant giving political power to the Malays. They had little appeal for the Chinese, who were at the root of the insurgency problem, and, if promoted prematurely, might have given the Malayan Communist Party, itself almost entirely Chinese, a chance of becoming the political champion of the Chinese against the Malays, which would have been fatal.(37)

The prescription is sound enough, as are Thompson's other principles of counter-insurgency: the government must function in accordance with the law; it must have an overall plan "forcing the insurgents to react to government measures, but flexible enough to take advantage of success", the government "must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas"; and "in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first".(38) Sound also is the acceptance of the old imperial subordination of the military to the civil government and the rigorous unification of effort in times of trouble.

However, these principles are derived from a specific imperial context and are unlikely to be adhered to by politically independent governments under revolutionary insurgent attack. An imperial government not only has a different kind of politico-military command structure, but also its overwhelmingly bureaucratic mode of ordering affairs obviates the "party political" internal struggles for power that are such a debilitating feature of independent States under insurgent attack. Moreover, it has not been a tendency of the armies of recently independent States to subordinate themselves to the civil power, especially in situations of violence, since it can normally be argued plausibly that it was the internal weakness of the civilian political system that allowed the violence to develop, if it did not actually give rise to that violence.

It must also be said, though here necessarily in brutal brief, that in the case of Malaya, more than anywhere else in the British Empire, the British had created a plural society of a kind that could be controlled easily by a foreign overlord class and probably, in the long run, *only* by such a class. It is not possible here to delineate the extraordinarily peculiar features of the Malayan insurgency, such as the central importance of the export economy and the extreme ineptitude, as a result of most unusual internal difficulties, of the Malayan Communist Party's politico-military strategy (39), the basic conservatism of an the racial groups, the fact that the insurgency was a peasant war only in a socially and geopgraphically marginal fashion, and the virtual lack of a highly educated, radicalized intellectual group. It is possible to add to the list of peculiarities deserving analysis the matter of comparative scale and the absence of outside sanctuary and aid, while remembering Thompson's dictum that "Infiltration can...only accelerate the momentum of an insurgency and will always be subsidiary to it." (40) Scale and the legitimacy conferred by time and habitual acceptance permitted the British in Malaya to treat the insurgency for the most part as only yet another outbreak of criminal violence of a kind imperial rulers had long come to expect, from time to time, in imperfectly civilized societies(41). The British effort in Malaya will almost certainly one day come to be regarded as one of the last in a long series of imperial pacifications rather than as a master lesson in countering Communist revolutionary warfare elsewhere, except in point of some specific tactics and techniques.

And yet Thompson's insistence upon the necessity to adhere to his principles - and above all adhere to what he has come to call the "long haul" strategy, the acceptance of the reality of what Communists call protracted revolutionary warfare—is altogether well-founded (42). The problem, however, has of course all along been whether a protracted war of a counterinsurgency kind can for long be accepted by a supporting Western government as nationally important enough to justify the blood, finance, and obloquy involved in such support.

* * * * * * * *

TO understand how there developed in the USA what came to be called counter insurgency doctrine, *a la francaise* to a limited extent, it is necessary first to notice certain peculiar features of the Kennedy regime as well as the international context in which the regime got under way.

John F. Kennedy, unlike his opponent for the presidency, Richard Nixon, campaigned openly in favour of overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. But as the operation developed, after he became President, it was discovered that guerrillas could not operate in Cuba in the face of the militia, and so there followed the ill-fated invasion. In the meantime Nikita Khrushchev on 6 January 1961, after scotching the likelihood of nuclear or even limited wars, went on to predict what he called "wars of liberation" within the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He emphasized the importance to the Sino-Soviet bloc of the success of the "anti-imperialist" movements in these regions and he

pledged aid to them as an "international duty" of all Communists. He said:

> ...these are wars which are national uprisings. In other words can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists towards such uprising? A most positive one...in the uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are risings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles. (43)

This was interpreted by close colleagues of Kennedy as the explication of a strategic doctrine. In April 1961 Secretary for Defence McNamara asked for a "150 per cent increase in the size of anti guerrilla forces." Next month Kennedy emphasized "the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations and sublimited, or unconventional war." (44)

Early in 1962 McNamara said that he felt the Khrushchev speech of 6 January 1961 "might well be one of the most important policy declarations in the 60's by any world leader" and he elaborated on this before a Congress committee :

> So long as we maintain the kind of retaliatory forces possessed by SAC and Navy Polaris...we will continue to deter (the USSR) from starting (global or limited) wars. Indeed, to the extent that we deter the Soviet Union from initiating these larger wars, we may anticipate even greater efforts on their part in the sublimited war area. Conflict, as Mr. Molotov so rightly pointed out, is a cardinal tenet of Communist doctrine. (45)

What is being emphasized here is that a government, the inner council of which was chiefly composed of aggressive-minded liberals, came early to see the counter-insurgency problem in strategic terms. This inner council was described by Dean Acheson as an "inner and private politbureau to control and supervise a foreign office, whose new head the President hardly knew at all." (46) Hence the world view of a comparatively few men was of very great importance. Moreover, when Kennedy sought out a comparative "outsider" with fighting experience of guerrilla warfare, Roger Hilsman, he spoke with a man who wrote early in 1962 : "...the Communists have found a chink in our armor. The new tactic is internal war..." (47)

This group combined within it a doctrinaire belief in liberal capitalism and what has been described as a 'qualified manipulative'(48) understanding of what revolutionary warfare was all about. In McNamara there was an almost rabid quantifier who once tried to suggest a few 100 pound bombs be dropped from a handful of ancient aircraft to stop the Pathet Lao(49). In Kennedy there was the belief that "...our strength may be tested at many levels" and that "A small group of disciplined Communists could exploit discontent and misery where the average income may be $60 or $70 a year and seize control, therefore, of an entire country without Communist troops ever crossing any international frontier."(50)

Sometimes the *obiter dicta* of these amateur counter-insurgents were even more inadequate, as in the speech of McNamara of 17 February 1962:

> In these conflicts, the force of world Communism operates in the twilight zone between political subversion and quasimilitary action. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of these nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means. You cannot carry out a land reform program if the local peasant leaders are being systematically murdered. (51)

More importantly perhaps, so far as the Kennedy regime's general counter-insurgent stance was concerned, was the combination of doctrinaire liberalism and the "qualified manipulative" approach of Walt Rostow who in a sense was the "ideologist" of the group. His remarkable book, *The Stages of Economic Growth,* significantly subtitled *A Non-Communist Manifesto* and, perhaps equally significantly, first published in 1960, argued that Communism was a disease. "It is a kind of disease," he wrote, "which can befall transitional society if it fails to organize effectively those elements within it which are prepared to get on with the job of modernization."(52) The "scavengers" of the modernization process, as he called the Communists, posed "a formidable problem, almost certainly what historians will judge the central chal-

lenge of our time; that is, the challenge of creating, in association with the non-Communist politicians and peoples of the preconditions and early take-off areas, a partnership which will see them through into sustained growth on a political and social basis which keeps open the possibilities of progressive, democratic development."(53) Since Westerners have become less clear what is meant by modernization, there was an element of sloganeering about this analysis but in general it may be said that what was meant by modernization by Rostow and Hilsman and others was "not generalized social change but rather change in a direction-to development in the sense of economic growth and physical security."(54) This, incidentally, is the latest argument being expounded by Western advisers and others in Vietnam.(55)

Rostow developed his doctrine, in specific counter-insurgent terms, in a speech to the Fort Bragg Special Warfare School which was very widely disseminated in 1961 and appeared in both the collections of counter-insurgent writings published the next year.(56) Once again he emphasized the organizational-manipulative techniques of the Communists in "transitional" societies, arguing that the USA had "a role to play in learning to deter the outbreak of guerrilla war, if possible, and to deal with it, if necessary" since "The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression; and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept."(57)

Thus the Kennedy regime adopted what might be called a two prong strategy : prevention if possible; the reorientation of the armed forces towards counterinsurgency or "stability operations" in case this were not possible. Prevention involved a number of moves. Most importantly so far as Latin America was concerned was the mounting of the Alliance for Progress in August 1961. $2 billion was to be injected into the region over a decade, half of it by the US Government, the other half by private, chiefly U.S., enterprises, in return for Latin American governments undertaking certain measures in regard to tax systems, land reform, low interest loans to farmers and small businesses, and education, housing, and health measures. There is no reason to doubt John Gerassi's contention that this was widely interpreted in Latin America as nothing other than an attempt to stop "Castroism."(58)

So far as Indo-China was concerned, the U.S. Administration, against the background of the Laos conference at Geneva, which resulted in a *de facto* partition of the country in 1962, sought means of putting the counter-insurgency doctrine into practice on both economic and military levels. It came to be decided by the U.S. Administration that "If the line was to be held, Vietnam rather than Laos was the place to hold it."(59) But of course the rhetoric about the central importance of Vietnam in regard to the South-East Asian "dominoes" had begun as far back as 1954 (60).

On the economic plane, as a result of General Maxwell Taylor's mission late in 1961, on 4 January 1962 a Joint Communique by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments was signed announcing "a broad economic and social program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means for improving his standard of living. This program represents an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the past few years. Social facilities in the fields of education and health will be established throughout the country. Roads, communications and agricultural facilities will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to the people."(61) The programme, worked out by Eugene Staley and Vu Quoc Thuc, was declared to be a comprehensive one. 'In sum,' as an American adviser, William A. Nighswongen put it, "...political and administrative reform, new economic programmes for rural areas, greatly increased United States advisory and supply efforts, a larger and more effective Vietnamese army, and other armed elements. Diem successfully ignored American pressure for more popular political participation."(62)

But one of the troubles, as the same adviser, described it, was that: "Most American officials had little training or experience with revolutionary warfare. Most of the highly competent military and civilian advisers in Vietnam (during 1956-1960) were examining events and proposing projects in terms of their previous experience with conventional programs of economic and social development and defense...preparations for a future war were based on the

requirements of the preceding conflict (i.e. Korea)." (63)

It was this lack that the Kennedy regime set about trying to make good by orientating both military and civilians towards the new situation; and also, in 1963, by underwriting a very ambitious but ill-fated social science research project in thirty-one countries, designed to use academics' special knowledge for the measuring of revolutionary forces or "insurgency prophylaxis." (64)

This was to go far beyond a major augmenting of the Special Forces, which had been formed in 1952, had seen action behind the enemy lines in Korea, and were a good deal more guerrilla than counter-insurgency orientated(65). A silver Trojan horse is scarcely a symbol of pacification(66). An attempt was made to alter the attitudes of professional military men. What was involved has been put succinctly by Colonel Robert G. Gard JR.:

> It was not until the Kennedy Administration emphasized the concepts of flexible response and counter-insurgency that restrictions on the use of force and the need to combine other considerations with military operations became widely accepted in principle within the military institution.
>
> In the search for national security policy, the military professional no longer could remain isolated and restrict his peacetime activities to preparation for war.. In June 1961, President Kennedy found it necessary to state in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he regarded them as "more than military men" and expected "their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation... But continued military preoccupation with the combat function precluded an adequate response to this requirement." (67)

However, though a Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) was installed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff section of the Pentagon and a White House National Security Memorandum in March 1962 laid down requirements for basic courses in counter-insurgency which were to be provided widely (68), the general approach being propagated by the Kennedy regime was not accepted at all willingly by the armed service chiefs. One important reason was their reluctance ever to be involved in a land war in Asia again; and their determination that if this should occur - "if there were any fighting at all, then there would be no holds barred whatsoever - including the use of nuclear weapons," according to Roger Hilsman (69).

But it was not just a matter of this kind. There was another reason : a refusal on the part of some service chiefs to accept that counter-insurgency was other than essentially a military issue. The general situation was summarized by Hilsman in the following manner :

> In the Special Forces School at Fort Bragg, in the war colleges and elsewhere in the armed services, there was a serious and systematic study of guerrilla warfare as it was known in the Philippines, Greece, Malaya, and so on. Out of this effort of study and debate came general agreement on the nature of guerrilla warfare and on the idea that meeting it successfully would require an emphasis on political, economic and social action into which very carefully calibrated military measures were interwoven. But an important segment of the military did not accept the emphasis on political warfare. In a speech at Fordham University on November 7, 1962, for example, General Earle E. Wheeler...said that what the United States was committed to support in Vietnam was "military action... Despite the fact that the conflict is conducted as guerrilla warfare... it is nonetheless military action. It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem is military." (70)

In a formal sense, U.S. Army Field Manuals not only accepted, but wrote in, the findings of the Kennedy inner circle (71) and on a certain level of training prepared itself for what has come to be called civic action(72). That it was in fact accepting was what an unsympathetic observer has called "the intellectually debilitating assumption that all counter-insurgencies can be won."(73) (In fact, the case of Vietnam was somewhat different since it came to be represented as a "test case".) The moment that counter-insurgency was accepted by the American military as an art they felt they had mastered, whether they really thought of it as primarily military or not, then defeat was unthinkable, and properly so from the military point of view.

But buried beneath this relationship between the Kennedy civilian theorists and the military there lay a parodox which was stated by Anatol Rapoport in this way :

> American intervention in South-east Asia is publicised as a "limited war." It must be kept in mind that

> what appears to Americans as "limited war" appears as total war to the people against whom it is waged. What appears as "control" of the pressure exerted on, say, the Vietnamese is only a delusion if for reasons of prestige, the United States has no choice but to escalate the war if "pressure" fails to bring the Vietnamese to their knees. The Clausewitzian principle implies *logically* that military policy ought to be geared to political objectives. But *psychologically* the implication is read the other way; political objectives are determined by military capacity. (74)

However, to be fair to the Kennedy theorists, they clearly did believe that military measures not only had to be, but would only need to be, a "carefully calibrated" component in a basically civil counter-insurgency approach, whether in Latin America or in Vietnam.

But Vietnam was to prove not only a "test case" for the doctrine but a very special case in terms of the efficacy of outside-organized insurgent movement. Elsewhere, it could be argued - and was argued by a theorist of Latin American revolutionary insurgency - that the "revolution had revolutionized the counter-revolution" (75); that is, that the American counter-insurgents had in fact developed powerful techniques and tactics for combating insurgency. Too much should not be made of the role of the Special Forces in destroying the Guevarist adventure in Bolivia. Guevara made awful errors, and it is too often not noticed that he was trying to overthrow a regime that in many ways was progressive even in the countryside(76). Nor should too much be made of Chile's "parliamentary revolution," since that country's constitutional history was unique in Latin America. By fighting on an urban instead of rural terrain, the Tupamaros' degree of success so far suggests that the future of revolutionary insurgency in Latin American remains very problematical(77). But of course the real 'counter-insurgent' successes have been those which have prevented subversion and low-intensity violence from developing into insurgency, which was the case not only with Guevara's adventure but in a number of other Latin American countries--and not only Latin American countries.

* * * * * *

VIETNAM, however, was an altogether different situation by 1965 when the U.S. commitment *en masse* began : a revolutionary insurgency on a very wide scale with insurgent regular units appearing to be about to cut South Vietnam in half and beginning perhaps to disintegrate the security forces of the Saigon Government. Effectively controlled by Hanoi, the insurgent movement was receiving increasing support from Northern regular forces. The U.S. Administration therefore saw itself as preventing a Northern, as well as Communist armed take-over. Hence the doctrine of graduated response, conceived in terms of aerial and naval attack on the North as well as build-up of ground forces in the South.

The *raison d'etre* of American intervention *en masse* was indeed chiefly formulated in terms of combatting "Aggression from the North," but though great emphasis was laid upon graduated military deterrence of further Northern incursions, the Hanoi political *regime's* safety was guaranteed in advance. At the same time U.S. forces were addressing themselves to the task of assisting in the putting down of a major revolutionary insurgency in the South. Hence the concept of "Two Wars" (sometimes "Three Wars," if "nation-building" were added to regular warfare and pacification), which earned the pellucid strictures of Sir Robert Thompson (78).

But of course this situation arose out of a failed counter-insurgency, in which American advice and advisers had been widely involved. The advice given appears to have been based in part on the following kind of assumption:

> The overall objective in the field of overseas internal defense is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to developed balanced capabilities for the internal defense of their societies. Psychologically, few of the developing nations are aware of the threat posed by Communist subversion, nor do they know how to cope with the blandishments and false hopes raised by Communist propaganda. (79)

The way was open to the doctrineless manipulators *and* the cold war liberals to show their paces. But though armed with this breathtakingly arrogant doctrine, they found themselves trying to "encourage and assist" a government which, with some justice, believed it understood the Communist threat rather better than American advisers. Unhappily though, the Diem Government sought to replicate, in an administratively very imperfect manner, the organizational modes of the Communist National Liberation Front (NLF).

The Advisers (who included a British team) were in such circumstances unable satisfactorily to implement their various schemes: an adequate land reform programme (80), a sensibly phased development of strategic hamlets (81), and the necessary harassment of Vietcong mainforce units (82). The list could be extended to include proper population and resources control, communications between hamlets and the regular army, the adequate arming and equipping of hamlets (83), administrative and legal reform, and the building up of an appropriate police force, to mention but a few obvious factors.

The profusion of terms --Counter-insurgency, Civic Action, Nationbuilding (84), Pacification, Rural Development, Stability Operations, later Revolutionary Development (RD)--among "counter-insurgents" was indicative of a basic uncertainty as to precisely what was being attempted in terms of the ultimate objective, a fact of even greater importance than the fact that most American officials up to 1960 at least had little training or experience of revolutionary warfare.

The weaknesses of the "pacification" under Diem (which grew quickly after his downfall) persuaded some American advisers, particularly Frank Scotton and Bob Kelly in beleaguered Quang Ngai province in 1963, that replication of some Communist methods, including armed propaganda squads, was the answer to the struggle against the NLF. Out of small successes there arose the grand concept in 1966 of Revolutionary Development, to be carried out by 59-man squads, political action teams including their own self-defence sections (85). At the same time a large proportion of the regular army was assigned to cover the activities of these teams which by 1968 had increased to 770 and involved 53,000 men. A major effort was begun also to co-ordinate the various facets of Revolutionary Development and to upgrade the Regional (RF) and local (PF) security forces.

It has recently been argued by Dr. Alex Carey of the University of New South Wales that from about 1966 U.S. policy, based upon a belief that the U.S.A. represents "the permanent revolution of mankind" (as President Kennedy once put it), has brought to bear upon South Vietnamese society the techniques of American behavioural science, particularly as developed by B.F. Skinner (86). That is, put very crudely, the U.S. "counter-insurgent" apparatus has sought to devise a system of rewards and punishments ("reinforcements") such as will induce South Vietnamese to support the incumbent government. It has also been argued by Professor S.P. Huntington that "forced draft urbanization and modernization" have deprived the rural revolutionary movement of the capacity to win power (87).

Undoubtedly a number of Western-engendered policies have been introduced into the struggle, particularly perhaps the notion of pacification through prosperity in the Mekong delta. This is a notion as old as imperial rule, of course, but never have such material resources been brought into play; never perhaps has a society's traditional attachments been so eroded by the propaganda of both sides, reinforced by the exigences of internal warfare of terrible intensity.

It must also be noticed that, until the Tet Offensive of 1968 at least, it remained possible for the U.S. commander, General Westmoreland, to adumbrate a theory of victory couched in predominately military terms. (88)

But though there have been various components in the struggle against the NLF and the Northern regular army, a struggle which had been won in terms of internal war by 1971, necessitating the invasion of 1972 by the North Vietnamese army *en masse,* it is suggested that the replication of the Communist mode of struggle has been the most striking component.

This comes out very clearly in the 1970 Plan, which is still in operation. The guiding principles of the Plan are:

- Territorial Security
- Protection of the People against Terrorism - i.e. Neutralization of the Vietcong Infrastructure
- People's Self Defence (PSDF)
- Local Administration
- Greater National Unity (The *Chieu Hoi* Programme)
- Brighter Life for War Victims (The Refugee Problem)
- People's Information (The Psyops and Propaganda Programme)
- Prosperity for All (Economic Development)

As to "Territorial Security," the main thrust is the further upgrading of the Regional and

Popular Forces, which replicate the two lower parts of what General Navarre once called the Vietminh forces' "Living pyramid." "Protection of the People against Terrorism" is primarily a replication, in the form of the "Phoenix Programme" teams, particularly in the case of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, of Vietcong modes of repression, despite earnest attempts properly to establish evidence against members of the infrastructure. "People's Self Defence" is an attempt to replicate a Communist-style "mobilization of the masses" through involving the very young, the old and women in support and combat units. "Local Administration" is an attempt to identify hamlet societies with the central government by providing funds for projects which, on the whole, are chosen by the more democratized hamlets. This is not inconsistent with the Communist approach during the struggle for power. The *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) programme is a mixture of proselytizing and recruiting, the returnees being employed in local forces or as Open Arms propaganda cadres very often, which is very similar to the Communist mixture that was being dispensed long before the *Chieu Hoi* programme was started in 1963. The refugee problem is indeed special. As to "People's Information," although the Government of Vietnam and its JUSPAO* allies dispose of far greater technical resources (e.g. television sets in hamlet squares) and are, of course, possessed of a message of economic freedom as a long term policy, the modes of propaganda are often astonishingly similar (89), vie with each other in terms of intensity, and - in this phase of NLF policy - compete with each other as to short-term objectives such as land redistribution.

The chief, and possibly crucial, difference lies in "Prosperity for All" or economic development, so far as the Plan is concerned. Pacification through prosperity, which was touched upon above, may at last come into its own in South Vietnam; and certainly would have come into its own if it had not been for the 1972 invasion by the North. There are good grounds for supposing that peasants are primarily concerned with economic freedom, since this is the primary condition for other forms of freedom meaningful to ordinary people. When this economic freedom is combined with the means of enhancing living standards, as has been clearly the case in the Mekong delta in recent years (through improved strains of rice, low-level mechanisation, better transportation etc.), then - provided always that security can be maintained-the Government of Vietnam obviously holds the advantage so far as popular support is concerned. Evidence from Communist sources is compelling in this regard. (90)

Over and above the provisions of the 1970 Plan there is the hope that there will arise out of an anti-Communist victory a measure of political pluralism and a degree of civic liberty unthinkable in a Communist society. But when a revolutionary war has reached the intensity that has long since been reached in South Vietnam, a parodoxical situation is engendered : the less technically perfect the replication of the Communist organizational modes are, the less chance of eventual success; the more perfect the replication—that is, the more thoroughly a political *regime,* as distinct from a democratic way of ordering affairs, is established—the less likelihood that a comparatively free society will arise out of the ashes of war. After all democracy is much more a mode of behaviour than a system; and it is a mode of behaviour which to a large extent goes into abeyance even in long-standing Western democracies in times of modern warfare and is unlikely to strike deep roots in a society afflicted by totalitarian Communist revolutionary warfare.

The redoubtable Colonel Nguyen Be who runs the Vung Tau training centre for RD (Rural Development) cadres is doubtless perfectly correct, in terms of the "people's war" (his phrase) he is trying to wage when he writes, "...The People's Defense Militia includes everyone from seven years of age to the oldest citizen without discrimination...No one has any legitimate reason to stay out of the struggle....the people and the militia are one ; the militia are the people, and the people are the militia. Therefore, our war system will be purely Vietnamese, not colonialist in form." (91) But such concepts suggest that for a "counter-insurgency" to be truly successful it must prevent widvspread conditions of insurgency from developing. But this is not to suggest that subversion of an existing political order can always be prevented from reaching the insurgent stage.

---

* *Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office — a joint civil and military agency, which was for a time responsible for all U.S. information output in Vietnam. It has now separated into its military and civil components.*

Notes and References

1. Lucian W. Pye in Harry Eckstein (Editor), *Internal War* (The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964), p. 160.
2. General Lionel Chassin qu. in F.M. Osanka (Editor), *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962), pp. 432-433.
3. Manfred Halpern, "The Morality and Politics of Intervention," in Richard Falk (Editor) *The Vietnam War and International Law* (Princeton, University Press, Princeton, 1967), pp. 57-58.
4. Walt Rostow in T.N. Greene (Editor), *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him* (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1962) p. 56.
5. *Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I : Year of Decisions* (The New American Library, New York, 1955), pp. 52-3.
6. Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49* (Washington, 1950), p. 1256.
   A Military Advisory Group was set up in the Philippines as part of the Military Assistance Agreement of 21 March 1947. Whether it was at that time counter-insurgency orientated the writer has not been able to discover.
7. See e.g. Resolution of the General Assembly, UN, 19 November 1949, in *ibid*, p. 780 ff.
8. David Horowitz (Editor) : *Containment and Revolution* (Blond, London, 1967), p. 10.
9. The public presentation of the American case in regard to Greece and the Balkans is to be found in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, op. cit.* For China, *United States Relations with China,* (based on the files of the Department of State, Washington, 1949) Annexe 118, pp. 710-719, shows that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) early in 1947 dated the cold war from early 1946 and saw China's struggle on a global scale.
10. On 20 March 1947 Paul Ramadier said of Vice Premier Thorez, "He has had the courage to put into words our will, our unanimous will." Jacques Duclos a leading French Communist also argued for the "French presence", though criticising policy measures. See Bernard Fall, "Tribulations of a Party Line", *Foreign Affairs,* No. 3, April 1955, pp. 501-502.
11. See e.g. *U.S. Counter-insurgency Forces* (Field Manual FM 31-22) (Department of the Army, Washington, November 1963), p. 6.
12. See *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, op. cit.*
13. Anatol Rapoport (Editor), *Clausewitz on War* (Penguin Books, London, 1968) p. 418. fn 31.
14. Allen W. Dulles : *The Craft of Intelligence* (Harper and Row, New York, 1963) p. 218.
15. In the case of both Iran and Guatemala, the international component was emphasized by the US Government. However it is fairly clear that in the latter case the "important shipment of arms...from Soviet-controlled territory" was a good deal less important in Guatemalan terms than the PGT's (Communist Party's) elaborate network of "front" organizations. See e.g. US State Department publications, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 : Basic Documents,* Vol. I, U.S. State Department, Washington, 1957, pp. 1303-1311.
16. See Daniel Ellsberg, *Pentagon Papers* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1971), p. 53 ff.
17. Quoted in Roger Hilsman : *To Move a Nation* (Doubleday, New York, 1967), p. 65.
18. The former CIA operative, Christopher Felix (pseud) in his *The Spy and His Masters* (Secker and Warburg London, 1963) writers p. 62: "The ultimate achievement of power is by no means limited to the control of secret operations themselves....No one familiar with Washington in the decade of the 'fifties discounts the heavy weight of the C.I.A. complex in the important American foreign policy decisions of the period....In the United States... (there is) a system whereby "outside" agents are brought into "inside" posts in the C.I.A. Washington hierarchy, and *vice versa,* all the while advancing in their careers".
19. See Hilsman *op. cit.,* p. 84, in regard to *The New York Times's* initial indignant denial of Indonesian charges of covert American interference during the rebellion of 1958 and its subsequent embarrassment; "....but the real damage was a growing cynicism in the press and their doubt about the truthfulness of the official statements of their own government'. Administration-Press relations in Vietnam became critical at the beginning of the 'sixties. See Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1967), Ch. XXII.
20. See Ruth McVey : *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1958); and for the Peking Conference see Denis Warner : *Out of the Gun* (Hutchinson, London, 1956) pp. 83-86.
21. Quoted in *Atlantic Alliance,* A Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1952, p. 31.
22. In the demonology of the more extreme theorists, the American preoccupation with thermo-nuclear warfare was held to be politically risible; the Americans were also apt to be held up as collaborators in revolutionary warfare campaigns through their anti-colonial antipathies. See e.g. Colonel Lacheroy's anecdote in Peter Paret : *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria* (Pall Mall Press, London, 1964), pp. 3-4.
23. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare - a French View of Counter-insurgency* (Pall Mall Press London, 1964), p. 5.
24. e.g. what Communists would call *"political* mobilization" Trinquier calls "the manipulations of populations". Indeed the most famous formulation of the French theorists was Colonel Gabriel Bonnet's equation: "Guerre de partisans - guerre psychologique - guerre revolutionnaire". Michael Howard believes that this "definition" has since been "generally accepted". *Studies in War and Peace* (Temple Smith, London, 1970), p. 179.
25. See e.g. General Callies's 'world map', qu. in F.M. Osanka (Editor), *op. cit.*

26. Henri Navarre, *Agonie de L'Indochine* (Paris, 1956), p. 50.
27. *ibid.*, p. 42. It should be noticed that it was not only army theorists who saw a world-historical significance in revolutionary warfare at this time. cp. Raymond Aron : "...as an instrument of revolutionary action, it is a force liable to alter the map of the world. In the treatise of a twentieth century Clausewitz, the Communist theory of revolutionary warfare would figure just as prominently as the theory of nuclear weapons". *On War*, London, 1968, p. 66-67; (Written 1957). But he argued that "Nothing can eliminate the inferiority of the European in this sort of fighting ("in the midst of populations of other races"). Human life has a different value in the West, with its low birth rate..." *ibid*, pp. 69-70.
28. e.g. Trinquier *op. cit* p. 8 : "We know that the *sine qua non* of victory in *modern warfare* is the unconditional support of the population... Such support may be spontaneous, though that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is *terrorism*".
29. c.p. "A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. A positive example: the defeat of the FLN in the Oran region in Algeria in 1959-60. In this region, which covers at least a third of the Algerian territory, FLN actions - counting everything from a grenade thrown in a cafe to cutting a telephone pole - had dwindled to an average of two a day", David Galula, *Counter-insurgency Warfare* (Pall Mall Press, London, 1964) pp. 77-78.
30. The direct cost of the war was estimated at between $5-10 billion. I. William Zartman, *Government and Politics in North Africa* (Methuen, London, 1964), p. 46. The French Army, which included some 120,000 Muslims by 1959, was about 300,000 strong, opposing an insurgent force of some 15,000 in Algeria, 35,000 on the Moroccan and Tunisian frontiers. *ibid.*, p. 62. At a Press conference on 10 November 1959, General de Gaulle said that, over five years, 1,400,000 "have served in Algeria in the forces of order". *International Review Service*, Vol. VI, No. 55, pp. 52-53.
31. It also involved, as had the guerrilla employment of tribals in North Vietnam, putting in jeopardy the futures, if not the lives often, of tens of thousands of militarily mobilized Muslim security personnel in the pursuit of an ultimately impossible political objective.
32. J.J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Faber and Faber, London, 1966) p. 328.
33. Whether the victory was permanent or not is somewhat obliquely questioned in Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945 - 1963* (Faber and Faber, London, 1973), p. 278. See also Note 36.
34. The writer is indebted to an unpublished paper by Mr. Andrew Selth (then at the Australian National Univ.) in regard to counter-insurgency in Cyprus.
35. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, (Chatto and Windus, London, 1966), p. 171.
36. See Milton Osborne, *Region of Revolt* (Pergamon Press, Sydney, 1970), pp. 140-141.
37. Robert Thompson, "Squaring The Error" *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968. pp. 442-453, op. on p. 448.
38. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, *op. cit.* pp. 51-57.
39. The writer is indebted to Mr. K.B. Jackson of the Australian National University who in an unpublished paper drew an at least tentatively useful distinction between what he called the "vertical" political organization of the MCP and the "lateral" organization of the Huks in the Philippines. The "temporary base" provided by the (later entirely resettled) Chinese "squatters" was quite different from what is normally used as a popular base.
40. Robert Thompson, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-445.
41. e.g. "The incidence of serious crime for the year showed a marked increases over 1949. This rise was due, in the main, to bandit activity, with particular emphasis on the seizure of Identity and Ration cards. There were 1,745 reports of documents being forcibly removed from their owners..." Federation of Malaya: *Annual Report 1950*, p. 152.
42. "Finally, if its cause is to be effective, the government must demonstrate both its determination and its capacity to win. These are the foundations of popular support. After all, there are not many backers for a losing side. At the height of an insurgency, if the issue is evenly balanced, neither the government nor the insurgent cause is a matter of great importance. At that stage there is only one political question : 'Who is going to win?', Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency, op. cit.*, p. 69.
43. Quoted in John S. Pustay, *Counter-insurgency Warfare* (The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1965), pp. 12-13.
44. Quoted in Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1964), p. 3.
45. Quoted Pustay, *op. Cit.*, p. 14.
46. Dean Acheson, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971.
47. Since beginning to write this paper, the writer has read Chester L. Cooper, *The Lost Crusade* (MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1970) and Mr. Cooper's article in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, in which he argues convincingly that the CIA's Office of National Estimates warned against US commitment *en masse* in South Vietnam in (and before) 1965. But the writer believes that this does not invalidate the point made above, *viz.* that the CIA operative mentality materially assisted the Kennedy "inner circle" in taking up a certain stance towards insurgency.
48. See Paul Kecskemeti, *Insurgency as a Strategic Problem* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1967), p. 14.
49. Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
50. Quoted, Kecskemeti, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
51. Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 5.
52. Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960), p. 164.
53. *ibid.*, p. 164.

54. Henry Bienen, *Violence and Social Change* (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1968), p. 62.
55. The writer is indebted to certain experts in this regard, Brigadier F.P. Serong pre-eminent amongst them. But see also the reference to the findings of Dr. Alex Casey below, note 86.
56. Franklin M. Osanka (Editor) *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962), and T.N. Greene (Editor), *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*, (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1962).
57. Greene, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.
58. John Gerassi, *The Great Fear in Latin America* (MacMillan, New York, 1965).
59. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
60. See e.g. statements by Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon in Allan B. Cole, *Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1956).
61. Text is in William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (Norton, New York, 1968), Appendix A, p. 293.
62. William A. Nighswongen, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam* (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1966), p. 53.
63. *ibid.*, p. 48.
64. Kathleen Gough in Theodore Roszak (Editor), *The Dissenting Academy* (Penguin Books, London, 1967).
65. See e.g. Field Manual 31-20, *op. cit.*
66. See Robin Moore, *The Green Berets* (Crown Publishers, New York, 1966).
67. Robert G. Card, "The Military and American Society", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971, pp. 701-702.
68. See e.g. Course prospectus, US Air Force Special Operations School, Florida, 1970. "The...School...is the product of a long process of evolution. The process was begun in March 1961 when President John F. Kennedy, responding to Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev's call for "Wars of National Liberation", cited the need for countering the "Subversive and Guerrilla Warfare" that are at the heart of Communist insurgency..."
69. Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
70. *ibid.*, pp. 424-425. But see also Harry F. Walterhouse, *A Time to Build* (University of South Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 27-31 for the views of other U.S. generals.
71. See e.g. Field Manuals, 31-20, 31-22.
72. See Field Manual 31-16.
73. Peter King, *The Literature of Counter-insurgency - Mainly anti-Communist*, Paper delivered at APSA Tenth Annual Conference, August, 1968, unpublished. Used with the author's permission.
74. Rapoport (Editor), *Clausewitz on War, op. cit.*, p. 77.
75. Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (Grove, New York, 1967).
76. I owe this insight to Mr. Kevin Hindle's unpublished thesis on Bolivian politics, Australian National Univ., Canberra, 1972, *A Condor among the Foxes*.
77. See Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, Adelphi Papers No. 79. London, August 1971, and *Urban Guerrillas* (M.G. Smith, London, 1972).
78. Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, (Chatto and Windus, London, 1969), Chapter 3. "The Other War" was the term used by Ambassador Cabot Lodge to describe pacification.
79. Field Manual 31-22, pp. 3-4.
80. See esp., Nighswonger, *op. cit.*
81. See esp., Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency op. cit.*
82. See esp., Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War* (Frederick Praeger, New York, 1966).
83. See esp., Milton E. Osborne, *Strategic Hamlets in Vietnam* (Cornell University Data Paper, New York, 1965).
84. Nation-building, the currently most frequently used term, was used by the U.S. Department of Defense, as early as 1961. Walterhouse *op. cit.* p. 5.
85. The writer is indebted to an unpublished paper of the Australian National University by Mr. Nicholas Warner for the substance of this paragraph.
86. The writer is indebted to Dr. Carey for a copy of his unpublished paper, *The Clockwork Vietnam : Psychology of Pacification*, (roneo, 1972). Some of his findings have appeared as "Clockwork Vietnam: Gaining Control", *Meanjin Papers*, Melbourne, Vol. 32, No. I, March 1973, pp. 45-54.
87. S.P. Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1968, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 642-656.
88. See General W.C. Westmoreland's speech of 21 November 1967 in Frank. E. Armbruster, Herman Kahn and others. *Can We Win in Vietnam? The American Dilemma* (Pall Mall Press, London, 1968), pp. 199-201.
89. See Geoffrey Fairbairn, "Vietnam and Psychological Attrition", *20th Century*, Melbourne, Summer 1969, pp. 117-133.
90. *RD Cadre Program*, Chi-Linh, October 1967, p. 15 and p. 25.
91. The writer is particularly indebted to Mr. Keith Hyland for information obtained at first hand in this regard.

OVERSEAS CHINESE: *China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-Ping reiterated at a National Day reception on 29 September the official line that the People's Republic welcomes moves by Overseas Chinese to adopt the citizenship of their host country. Roughly one-fifth of the estimated 15 million Overseas Chinese live in Malaysia and, with the prospective establishment of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations, Peking's attitude in practice to this sizeable minority will be carefully scrutinized by all South-East Asian countries.*



Peking, Kuala Lumpur and the Chinese Minority in Malaysia

Goh Cheng Teik

IN New York, official delegations from Kuala Lumpur and Peking have been conducting government-to-government negotiations aimed at removing all the obstacles, technical or political, to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Federation of Malaysia and the People's Republic of China. They are led by H.M.A. Zakaria and Huang Hua, the ambassadors of the two countries to the United Nations.

The fact that Malaysian and Chinese envoys are talking officially to each other is an index to the depth of change in Kuala Lumpur-Peking relations. In the era (1957-70) when Tunku Abdul Rahman was the Prime Minister, Kuala Lumpur maintained a total "non-recognition" and "no-contact" policy. It was felt amongst other things that "recognition" and "contact" would retard the process of building a united, multi-racial nation.

Abdul Razak, the successor to Rahman as Prime Minister, is equally committed to nation-building but he sees signs of change in China's approach to foreign policy. After the noisy Cultural Revolution, the Chinese under the steady hand of Chou En-lai have played down "revolution" and "people's war" and have concentrated on "diplomacy", "peaceful co-existence" and "government-to-government" relations. Accordingly, he recast Malaysia's China Policy to suit the changing circumstances.

Kuala Lumpur's new China Policy was stated by Prime Minister Razak at the 1971 session of the United Nations General Assembly. "It is beyond doubt that the Government of the People's Republic of China is *de jure* and *de facto* the Government of China," he declared. (1) Hitherto, Kuala Lumpur had pursued a 'One China, One Taiwan Policy'. When balloting on Peking's admission to the United Nations took place, Malaysia voted for the Albanian Resolution for the first time in history and helped to bring Peking back into the family of nations.

The *detente* and *rapprochement* with China have also to be seen in the context of Razak's non-aligned and neutral policy. The new Prime Minister is convinced that the day for entangling alliances is over for South-East Asia. The States in the region should phase out bilateral or multilateral alliances and adopt a policy of equidistance towards America, Russia and China. Kuala Lumpur enjoys stable diplomatic relations with Washington. With Moscow, ambassadors were exchanged in 1968. The time is, therefore, opportune for reconciliation with Peking. Razak hopes, of course, that this policy of equidistance

will impress upon the big Powers that the region harbours malice towards none and persuade the Chinese and others to support the creation of "a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" in South-East Asia.

* * * * * * *

THE path towards diplomatic relations with China has so far not created any "backlash" within Malaysia. Neither has it been opposed in other States within South-East Asia although Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia would like Prime Minister Razak not to hurry towards Peking. In the era of *detente rapprochement* with China is not out of tune with the times. Tokyo, Bonn, Canberra and Wellington have established diplomatic relations with Peking while still remaining allies of Washington. Even the United States, a one-time arch-rival, has opened a mission in the Chinese capital which operates as an embassy although is labelled "liaison office". As for the Thais, they have overcome their initial hesitancy and are now even more enthusiastic than the Malaysians in reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Chinese.

Nevertheless, there remains lingering doubts in certain quarters inside and outside Malaysia as to the wisdom of diplomatic ties with China in the immediate future. These doubts centre on the fact that there exists a large, sprawling, ethnic Chinese minority in Malaysia. According to the 1970 census, it comprised 34.14 per cent of the national population. In absolute numbers, this represents the largest, single concentration of ethnic Chinese in the world outside of Mainland China and Taiwan. The suspicion therefore, is that a Peking mission in Kuala Lumpur may become a Trojan Horse from which agents will surface in the night to subvert the legitimate government of Malaysia and usurp power.

POPULATION OF MALAYSIA

1970		
Malays	4,871,643	46.67%
Other indigenes	910,694	8.72%
Chinese	3,564,502	34.14%
Indians & Pakistanis	936,341	8.97%
Other Immigrants	156,250	1.50%
	10,439,430	100.00%

Source: Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur.

The fear that the Chinese minorities in South-East Asia may be used as an instrument in China's foreign policy is not new. When he was Prime Minister, Rahman spoke frankly about what he saw as Peking's subversive acts and why he could not agree to diplomatic ties. For instance, when asked in Parliament in August 1968 why he allowed a Russian but not a Chinese embassy to be set up in Kuala Lumpur, he replied:

> "(I) do not know whether Communist China has done it directly, but indirectly she has many thousands of her agents in this country whose sole aim and object... is to try to overthrow the democratic government of this country by force of arms. For that reason we cannot have diplomatic or consular relations with her as this would be a help to these subversive elements, who owe (their) loyalty to China....
>
> If China decides to use their hammer and sickle the way Russia is using them, there is no reason why we should not be on good terms with them; but they are using it differently; they are using the hammer to break our heads (laughter), and that is why we are not able to make friends with them (laughter)." (2)

In pre-*detente* days, this fear was equally present in the minds of many American specialists on Asian affairs. Doak Barnett, for example, says explicitly that Peking regards the Nanyang (Overseas) Chinese as an instrument to be used for the advancement of its political objectives. On coming to power, the Chinese Communists inherited "the idea that all people of Chinese blood and culture, wherever they reside, are a part of the national entity of China, for whom the government of China is responsible." Hence, the issuing of declarations proclaiming Peking's determination to protect "the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad." They also inherited the belief that the backing of the Overseas Chinese is important to China's domestic politics. "In a sense, the struggle since 1949 between the Communists and the Nationalists for political influence among the Overseas Chinese is simply an extension of the civil war in China.... The Nationalists regard anti-Communist Overseas Chinese as a symbol of continuing resistance to the Peking regime, while the Communists appear to feel that Overseas Chinese support is symbolically necessary for the ratification of their succession to power in China." (3)

He rejects Peking's statements issued after

1954 exhorting the Chinese minorities to come to terms with South-East Asian nationalism as propagandistic. "It has little relevance to Singapore and Malaya, where the Chinese Communists regard the Overseas Chinese as their main hope for the ultimate establishment of Communist-controlled regimes. And throughout South-East Asia Peking continues to foster ever closer ties with Chinese who retain their Chinese citizenship and still maintain links even with those who acquire local citizenship." (4)

* * * * * * *

THE lingering doubts about Peking's true intentions towards Malaysia should not be readily dismissed as out-of-date. On the contrary, the basis of these doubts should be examined and a rational sober analysis of Peking's Overseas Chinese Policy undertaken because if it can be demonstrated that the Chinese Government is double-faced then Prime Minister Razak ought in the enlightened interests of Malaysia and South-East Asia to call a halt to his policy of *detente* and *rapprochement*. Since diplomatic relations have not yet been sealed (November 1973), it is still not too late to do so.

Fortunately, Peking's Overseas Chinese Policy has been recently scrutinized by a young Australian historian, Stephen Fitzgerald. His book, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970,* has helped to clarify the situation. Fitzgerald's documentary evidence makes it clear that since the mid-1950s a definite and distinct contrast in the approaches of Taipei and Peking to the Nanyang Chinese has emerged.

The Kuomintang Government (based in Taipei) continues the Overseas Chinese Policy formulated by Sun Yat-sen to this day. It follows the principle of *jus sanguinis* and regards any person born of a Chinese father, or of a Chinese mother where the nationality of the father is unknown or indeterminate, as a Chinese citizen. He may have been born in Timbuktu and accorded an African nationality but he will still be claimed as a Chinese citizen by Taipei. Since he is, according to the 1929 Nationality Law, a Chinese national, he is expected to know Mandarin, to obtain a Chinese education, to observe the ancient Confucian traditions and to transmit the Chinese heritage to succeeding generations. In other words, the Kuomintang believes in the slogan: "Once a Chinese, Always a Chinese"

Initially, the newly-established *Kungch antang* (Communist Party) Government at Peking did not break with its predecessor's *jus sanguinis* policy. Until 1954, it gave the impression that it too regarded ethnic Chinese residing overseas as their property. Fitzgerald suggests that the fear of alienating the Nanyang Chinese (to the benefit of the Nationalists) and the immediate need for foreign exchange (via remittances to relatives in China) may have prompted the Communists to delay the break with the past. Eventually, Peking decided to withdraw the priority for the Overseas Chinese in its decision-making process and to make relations with their overseas kith and kin subordinate to the country's larger foreign policy objectives.

By the mid-1950s, Jawarlahal Nehru (India), U Nu (Burma), Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia), David Marshall (Singapore) and others had managed to impress upon Prime Minister Chou En-Lai that the Nanyang Chinese were a liability not an asset to Peking in its search for good neighbourly relations with other Asian states. As a result, the *Kungch' antang* resolved to break with the Overseas Chinese Policy inherited from Nanking and Chungking. They announced in unequivocal language that any ethnic Chinese who acquired a foreign nationality ceased to be a citizen of the People's Republic of China. Concrete manifestation of this was the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty signed in April 1955. According to this agreement, a Chinese immigrant who acquired Indonesian nationality ceased to be a Chinese citizen.

It is true that problems arose in the course of implementation. A certain period of time was allowed to those concerned to decide whether they wanted to be Chinese or Indonesian citizens. According to Donald Willmott, the Chinese negotiations were prepared to renounce Peking's claim to (i) those who had already become Indonesian citizens and (ii) those who did not make a positive declaration to accept Chinese nationality. (5) The Indonesian side rejected this because it wanted to accept as Indonesian nationals only those who had made an *active* choice, who *actively* renounced Chinese nationality and *actively* embraced Indonesian citizen-

ship. Djakarta's view prevailed but in the course of implementation there arose the thorny question of persons who remained *passive*, who neither opted actively for Indonesian nor Chinese citizenship.

In October 1956, Chou En-lai re-stated to David Marshall, a leading politician from Singapore, Peking's abandonment of the *jus sanguinis* principle. He said that "any Chinese resident in Singapore who voluntarily obtains Singapore citizenship will no longer be a Chinese citizen." (6) In December, he went one step further and declared that those who acquired foreign nationalities ceased to be Chinese, not merely Chinese citizens. He told the Overseas Chinese that those "who acquire the nationality of the countries of residence by voluntary decision and according to local laws, are no longer Chinese people (**jen-min**)". As for those who chose to remain China's citizens, Chou instructed them to abstain entirely from politics. "(We) do not promote the organization of Communist or other democratic parties among Overseas Chinese.... (If they want) to participate in political parties, they should return to China. But it is impermissible to do so locally; this would invite misunderstanding in the countries of residence."(7)

* * * * * * *

PEKING'S Overseas Chinese Policy is by no means expedient and opportunistic. On the contrary, it accords in full with the social philosophy of the Chinese Government and the larger interest of the Chinese state.

The Chinese Government is controlled by the *Kungch' antang* (Communist Party). Their leaders are class-not race-minded. They have dedicated themselves to the cause of the peasantry and proletariat in the world, not the greater glory of the Han Chinese. When they view the social condition of South-East Asia through these Socialist lenses, it becomes self-evident which side deserves more sympathy and support: the natives or the immigrants.

It is true that not all the Chinese immigrants of South-East Asia are bourgeois. They came to this part of the world as impoverished migrants in the pre-war period and many of their descendants are still "coolies" This is a fact which cannot be refuted. Nevertheless, in a *relative* (not absolute) sense, the general living conditions of the natives in South-East Asia are worse than those of the immigrants. Most indigenes have still not yet progressed beyond traditional fishing and farming into trawler fishing, cash-crop cultivation, mining, manufacturing, banking, shipping, import-export/wholesale-retail trade and other modern sectors of the economy (unlike their immigrant fellow-countrymen). Needless to say, there are important exceptions. The Malays of Singapore and Malaysia, for example, have lately been breaking into these more productive areas.

Faced with a situation in which the bourgeoisie is heavily Chinese while the peasant and proletarian masses are overwhelmingly native, the *Kungch' antang* have no choice but to sympathize with the "have-not" classes unless they are prepared to renounce their Socialist conviction. In practice, it means that Peking will share more class solidarity with the South-East Asian natives than with their Nanyang kith and kin.

Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's Chinese are modernists, not traditionalists—a fact which is frequently overlooked. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese, they do not revere Confucius, Mencius, Lao-Tze and other sages from the past as they regard these thinkers as irrelevant. Neither do they profess their faith in Buddhism and other religions inherited from the past because as Marxists, they are atheists. In other words, they have given up the ancient culture of China.

In contrast, the Nanyang Chinese are still generally traditionalist. The urban, Western-educated minority may be cosmopolitan (though not necessarily proletarian) in outlook but the majority—the Chinese-educated and illiterate masses—still observe the old customs and traditions and celebrate the religious and semi-religious festivals handed down from the past. Peking's Chinese will find it extremely difficult to discover much affinity with "kith and kin" who still fervently uphold the "feudal", "decadent" culture of traditional China (which they have destroyed in its land of origin!).

Doak Barnett suggests that the *Kungch' antang* needs the support of the Overseas Chinese so that their succession to power in Peking can be symbolically legitimized. This contention

is an over-statement of the highest magnitude and represents a gross misunderstanding of the sources of both Nationalist and Communist strength. Sun Yat-sen sought out the Overseas Chinese assiduously because he was *a rebel from without.* He had no power-base inside China and had to anchor himself in the *hua-chiao* (Overseas Chinese) communities of South-East Asia, America and elsewhere, at least until the fall of the Manchus. Chiang Kai-shek continued the search for *hua-chiao* support in the Nanking and Chungking eras because he needed contributions to the economic regeneration of the motherland and later, the war effort against the Japanese. In the post-Civil War period, the *generallissimo* still needs the *"hua-chiao"* because he wants them to support the eventual "liberation" of continental China from Marxist "tyranny". Since the Chinese in Hong Kong and South-East Asia exceeded the population in Taiwan, they constitute in *Kuomintang* estimation a most vital third force.

Mao Tse-tung, unlike Sun Yat-sen, was *a rebel from within.* He never left the soil of China throughout the long struggle. He built his power-base inside the heartland of China and managed to win the peasants, "the great, silent majority", to his side. His Party's mandate to rule had been given by the Chinese people during the Civil War. It would be far-fetched, to put it mildly, to imagine that Mao has still to await the stamp of legitimacy from a few scattered millions overseas when he had already obtained it from the six or seven hundred million in China Proper!

Unlike Taiwan, China does not need the "Overseas Chinese" for its survival. Peking has 800 million inhabitants within its jurisdiction who have demonstrated their competence to make China strong. In the initial post-revolutionary years when the newly-established government had not yet built its channels of foreign trade, remittances from overseas may have been appreciated as a supplementary source of foreign exchange, but in later years, this could hardly be so. By the 1970s, when China has embarked on large-scale trading with the industrial giants of the world, overseas remittances must constitute mere drops of water in the bucket. In fact, Taiwan too does not need the "Overseas Chinese" for its survival. The position will become apparent in the event that Chiang's heirs should decide to give up the forlorn hope of "liberating" Continental China and look inwards.

* * * * * * *

IN the 1970s, the theoretical basis of Peking's Overseas Chinese Policy is being reinforced by hard realities prevailing in the international system. China's rift with Russia has widened to such a point that Moscow is trying to do what Washington did in the 1950s and 1960s: to erect a wall of containment around the Chinese State. The Soviet Communist Party Secretary-General, Leonid Brezhnev, has proposed the formation of an Asian Collective Security System. Bangladesh, India and Mongolia have already indicated their positive responses to this suggestion. Comrade Brezhnev did not say that it would be directed at Comrade Mao but since the proposal appeared against a backdrop of serious border incidents and deteriorating Moscow-Peking relations, it could not have been intended otherwise.

The prospects of Moscow encircling China in the 1970s and 1980s are better than Washington's chances in the 1950s and 1960s. At most the Americans could only have succeeded in erecting a semi-circle to contain China: from Japan to India. The other semi-circle was in the hands of a "fellow-Socialist" State: the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Russians can, on paper, draw a complete circle around China. The People's Republic of Mongolia is on their side. They have already stationed massive numbers of troops along the entire Sino-Soviet border - from the Soviet Far East to Soviet Central Asia. India and Bangladesh have been drawn into their orbit by treaties of friendship and co-operation and other bilateral ties. If the Russians can, through diplomacy, aid and trade, win over Japan, the two Koreas, Taiwan and the South-East Asian States to their brand of threat perception, then they will be able to encircle China completely.

Peking is fully aware of Moscow's intentions and its prospects in the Asian region. It is determined to prevent total encirclement by a Russian-led alliance: hence, the campaign to win the hearts and minds of the uncommitted Asian States from Burma to Japan. The Chinese have achieved the long-delayed peace settlement with the Japanese. Peking went to the extent of unilaterally renouncing its substantial claim for

war damages. This action was evidently intended as an investment in the future political goodwill of the Japanese people. The *Kungch' antang* have been offering "sweet reasonableness" to their old rivals, the *Kuomintang,* and have promised not to be harsh in the event that they should decide to rejoin the big Chinese family.

This campaign to win the hearts and minds of the uncommitted is extending to South-East Asia. Peking is talking unofficially to Bangkok despite the fact that the Thais were, and still are, on the other side of the fence in the Indo-Chinese wars. Chou En-lai has shown great appreciation of Razak's new foreign policy and Kuala Lumpur's resolve to neutralize the South East Asian region. "Ping-pong" and "badminton" diplomacy has already started in selected South East Asian States, namely, Thailand and Malaysia.

This desire to win over the South-East Asian States to their side in the dispute with the Russians, or at least, to make them stay non-aligned, means that Peking has to adhere more strictly to its Overseas Chinese Policy. Out of the ten or so States in the region only one (Singapore) is administered by "Overseas Chinese". The rest, including Malaysia, are ruled by native-led governments. These native-led governments can be readily persuaded to believe, particularly in the light of the Sino-American *detente,* that China does not pose a direct, across-the-border threat to their security in the 1970s but it will take more than words to assure them that Peking will not take advantage of diplomatic *rapprochement* to energize the *"hua-chiao"* politically and disturb the internal equilibrium in the respective States. Liberal and circumspect statesmen like Razak bin Hussein (and the late Dr. Ismail bin Abdul Rahman) can appreciate the sincerity of Peking's intentions but other native leaders in the region are prepared to be convinced only by deeds, not words.

The Russians are, of course, vigilant. They are constantly on the look-out for any fragment of evidence that can be used to stick the "Great Chinese Chauvinist" label on the backs of the *Kungch' antang* and to brand them as betrayers of Socialism. A case in point is the May Thirteenth Incident in Malaysia. Soviet diplomats in Kuala Lumpur knew from their own eye-witness reports that these 1969 inter-racial riots had a local origin (8) but *New Times,* a Soviet weekly, decided to represent it as an event caused by pro-Mao elements in Malaysia on the instruction of the "Great Chinese chauvinist and extreme nationalist" government in Peking. (9) Under the circumstances, Mao's diplomats when they do arrive in Kuala Lumpur will have-in their relations with the local Chinese - to bend backwards to be seen to be correct.

* * * * * * *

CONTRARY to popular beliefs, it can be argued that a Chinese diplomatic presence in Kuala Lumpur can produce a salutary effect on native-immigrant relations in Malaysia and hasten the phasing-out of communalism from the politics of this plural society. To those who become knowledgeable about Malaysian affairs only when inter-racial clashes and other bad news hit the newspaper headlines, this prediction must appear over-optimistic and far-fetched. However, a little trouble to find out about matters that have not made headlines in the quarter-century-since the outbreak of the Emergency (10) may reveal that the forecast for more racial stability in the future is not entirely based on wishful thinking.

The Emergency, which started in 1948, set the clock back for the process of national integration and nation-building. Despite the fact that there were also Malays amongst the ranks of the armed insurgents, British propaganda declared that the rebellion was a Chinese monopoly. As a result, the Chinese minority as a whole were castigated, not only by the British colonial government but also by the Malays. It was no coincidence that in the West Coast of Malaya (where most Chinese immigrants resided) only rural ethnic Chinese were selected for and transplanted into the "new villages" or strategic hamlets built in the course of the counter-insurgency effort. This massive transmigration itself accentuated the segregated pattern of living in Malaya.

In view of what the Malays commonly regarded as an act of "treachery" by the Chinese immigrants (the Emergency), it was extremely difficult to convince them that there were still many Chinese who remained loyal and that a permanent stake in the land (citizenship) was an important catalyst in the evolution of national loyalty. What eventually brought them together was the

struggle for independence. The United Malay National Organization (UMNO) led by Tunku Abdul Rahman demanded independence but Britain refused on the ground that the various races would be at each other's throats the moment the British Army departed. Faced with this *divide et impera* tactic, UMNO sought out MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) and the two agreed to present a united front against British Imperialism. The UMNO-MCA Alliance was extremely popular. It won 51 out of 52 contested federal seats in 1955. (11) With this huge mandate from the Malayan people, the Alliance could-and did-bargain with London from a position of strength.

Meanwhile, the native and immigrant leaders worked out among themselves a formula for national integration and unity in the post-independence period. UMNO agreed to relax the conditions for citizenship. (It was thanks to this concession that a million ethnic Chinese were able to obtain citizenship within a year of independence). MCA in return accepted the Special Position of the Malays and Other Natives (12) and the choice of Malay as the sole national and official language ten years after independence.

For the next twelve years after independence, this compromise formula was attacked from both extremities. The Malay extremists within and without UMNO criticized the decision to grant citizenship to persons whose loyalty towards Malaya (later Malaysia) was still "suspect" and demanded a vigorous implementation of the provisions on special rights, national language and, by extension, the medium of national education. The Chinese extremists inside MCA and the Opposition Parties, on the other hand, loudly protested against the loss of equal rights by the immigrants, the failure to make Chinese an official language, the failure to recognize Chinese-medium education and so on.

After the May Thirteenth Incident (which broke out at the end of a hot, uninhibited election campaign), the Government decided to enforce the original UMNO-MCA consensus involuntarily. And so the Malaysian Constitution was amended by Parliament (126 For: 17 Against: O Abstaining) to make it illegal to question the premises of national policies pertaining to citizenship, national language, the medium of national education and the existence of a constitutional monarchy. (13) The enforcement of this consensus has been achieved at the price of free speech but it has closed the loopholes for political opportunism; lowered the communal temperature and persuaded "the great silent majority" to reconcile themselves to the *status quo*.

Diplomatic relations with Peking will facilitate the acceptance of the UMNO-MCA formula by the Chinese minority in Malaysia and expedite the erosion of communalism in Malaysian politics. In the first place, the *Kungch 'antang* believe that the Malaysian Chinese should master *Bahasa Malaysia* (the national language) and use it in their daily life. Their view is that Chinese settlers anywhere should learn the local language so as to communicate with the local population, understand them and live in harmony with them. It is an asset, of course, to retain the Chinese tongue but that is not absolutely necessary. There is no question of Mandarin becoming extinct in the event that the "Overseas Chinese" do not use it. Extinction may occur in the Nanyang region but the 800 million Chinese speakers in the People's Republic of China should be more than capable on their own to keep their language alive for posterity!

In the second place, Peking accepts that the Malaysian Chinese should not only be integrated but even assimilated. Education in *Bahasa Malaysia,* instead of Mandarin, may lead to a dilution of Chinese culture in Malaysia and the detribalization of the settler community but the *Kungch 'antang,* in direct contrast to the *Kuomintang,* will not shed tears over the death of a way of life they had condemned as "feudal" and "decadent". In fact, Peking is prepared to go one step further and recommend that the Malaysian Chinese be converted *en bloc* to Islam! Chou En-lai hinted this when he told Lee Kong-chian, the son-in-law of the famous Tan Kah-kee, that religion was a snag to the assimilation of the Chinese settlers in Malaysia and Singapore but that, as an atheist, he found Islam as good a religion as any other. (14)

In the third place, China will act as a catalyst in assisting the Malaysian Chinese to resolve once and for all the so-called "identity" question. From time to time, some, including the Malaysian-born, have felt disillusioned, neglected and unwanted. They have toyed with the idea of migration, invariably to Singapore, Australia, Canada, United States and Britain, and rarely China! By accepting all Malaysian Chinese as

Malaysians, not Chinese, and by urging them to look inwards and integrate, Peking may awaken in them a new sense of pride and thrill in being Malaysian. In the course of time even the hesitant and reluctant may appreciate that it is not entirely irrational to come to terms with Malay nationalism and accept it as part and parcel of the Malaysian way of life.

* * * * * * *

TO avoid giving the impression that the arrival of Mao's envoy in Kuala Lumpur will usher in a golden age in Malaysian history and Sino-Malaysian relations, it is necessary to stress that so far this article has been viewing the problem in a long-term perspective. In the short run, it is not impossible that the establishment of Kuala Lumpur-Peking diplomatic relations may lead to "over-reaction" by some Malaysian Chinese, a mild "back-lash" among the Malays, particularly the youths, and a partial set-back in race relations. The governments in Kuala Lumpur and Peking will undoubtedly act in good faith but they may not suffice to defuse *at once* all the time-bombs of Overseas Chinese chauvinism.

For more than two decades, the Malaysian Chinese, except for the sick and the elderly, have been totally sealed off from contact with the People's Republic of China. This policy has not been entirely negative because it has helped the Chinese immigrants to look inwards, to find their place within the evolving nation-State and to develop a sense of belonging to their land of adoption at a critical, formative period. Now that the "hump" stage in nation-building is over, this policy can afford to be relaxed but, in the meanwhile, a certain romantic yearning for the ancestral lands and an uncritical admiration for the New China have grown like creepers in a *belukar*. (15) Such a state of mind and emotion, if unduly excited, can result in displays of excessive enthusiasm.

The Malaysian Government is aware of this problem and has pursued a policy of "controlled exposure" in the last two years. The Home Ministry under the late Dr. Ismail bin Abdul Rahman started to raise the lid on selected occasions. This practice is being continued by his successor, Ghazali bin Shafie (an ex-head of the Foreign Office). Malaysian traders visit Canton regularly, particularly during the trade fairs. Ping-pong and badminton players have played friendly matches at Peking, Shanghai and other Chinese cities. Doctors have toured hospitals and other medical institutions in China. At the same time, Chinese trade missions, ping-pong players and badminton stars have visited Malaysia. Chinese-made films on the Afro-Asian Table-Tennis championship in Peking, China's admission to the United Nations, the visits of Nixon and Tanaka to China and so on have been shown in Malaysian cinemas. Periodicals like *China Pictorial* and *China Reconstructs* now circulate freely within Malaysia.

As a result of such limited exposure, a more sophisticated appreciation of China is gaining ground within the Malaysian Chinese community. For instance, Malaysians who went to China with great expectations have returned with mixed feelings. They were impressed by the vigour and vitality of the Chinese economy but they noticed that the standard of living was still not high. Cinema-goers noticed that the Chinese delegate at the United Nations delivered his speech in a tone and manner unfamiliar to them. Sporting-fans saw that while the two top Chinese badminton stars in the men's singles were able to reach the world's highest standard of play, the others, including the ladies, lagged far behind them.

Whatever "over-reaction" there may be in the aftermath of diplomatic relations between Kuala Lumpur and Peking, it is safe to say that it will not last in the long-run. China has a big stake in Malaysia. Peking wants the *rapprochement* with the Malaysian Government in general and the Malays in particular to succeed so that it can prove to the Indonesian, Filipino and other governments which are preoccupied with the "Overseas Chinese" question that there are no valid grounds for anxiety and fear. In other words, China is not merely looking for reconciliation with Malaysia but is playing for a diplomatic scoop in the whole of South-East Asia. Therefore, Peking can be expected to help Kuala Lumpur bury whatever Overseas Chinese chauvinism there may still be in Malaysia.

Notes and References

1. *Foreign Affairs Malaysia,* December 1971, p. 13.
2. *Malaysian Hansard,* Volume 5, Part 1, 21 August 1968. Rahman's statement was not well-timed because while he was speaking, Russian troops (without his knowledge) were making their way into Czechoslovakia to displace the Dubcek Government!
3. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy* (Harper, New York, Vintage Edition, 1962), pp. 185-6.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
5. Donald Wilmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958* (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, I thaca, N.Y., 1961), p. 44
6. Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970*(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972), p. 112.
7. *Ibid*
8. See, for example, Goh Cheng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971).
9. *Reuter,* 13 June 1969.
10. The guerrilla war in Colonial Malaya is officially dated back to June 1948 when a State of Emergency was declared; hence, the name "Emergency."
11. On the eve of the July 1955 federal election, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) entered the Alliance.
12. A distinguished High Court judge has written lucidly on this subject. *See* Muhammad Suffian bin Hashim, *An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1972).
13. The existence of the Sultans and the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong as constitutional monarchs was not a bone of contention between the races but it was inserted as an additional forbidden topic to set at rest whatever anxieties the Malay aristocracy might have entertained about its future.
14. "We (Lee Kong-chian and Chou En-lai) discussed the overseas Chinese in general, and Mr. Chou's advice to them was: 'Observe the local laws, orientate yourselves to local conditions, and be friendly with the local people'.

    Mr. Chou observed that there was a small 'snag' over the assimilation of Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia. He put it down to a question of religion. But he said that Islam is as good a religion as any other, although he himself was an atheist.

    He felt therefore that this should not be too great an obstacle." *Straits Times,* 9 June 1965.
15. *Belukar* is a Malay word for secondary jungle.

THAILAND: *In the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC), Thailand has developed probably the most extensive formal counter-insurgency organization in South-East Asia. But, the author argues, there remains "something not wholly committed about the present Thai counter-insurgency effort". This he attributes mainly to a lack of co-ordination, and a duplication of functions, of the multifarious departments and programmes deployed against Communist subversion and insurgency.*

Organizing Counter-Insurgency. The Thai Experience

Justus M. van der Kroef

IN December 1965, at a time when Communist guerrilla insurgency in Thailand, aided by Peking and Hanoi, had begun to assume a more dangerous and—organizationally—a more solidified character, the Thai Government established the framework of what is by now the oldest and in some respects the most extensive formal counter-insurgency organization in South-East Asia, the so called Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). Though formally replaced in June, 1969, by the Communist Prevention and Suppression Directorate, the original name and purpose of the organization-though not its initial structure-have remained in effect until this day. (1) The following pages, while noting some of the internal structural changes that have occurred over the years, will deal with CSOC as a single ongoing agency. Also, the emphasis in this discussion, it is to be remarked at the outset, will fall on organization and its problems, rather than on operational results.

CSOC's proper name, it may be observed *inter alia,* has occasionally prompted discussion on a different score: an organization which boldly proclaims its "Communist Suppression" function in its name may well be viewed by some as insensitive to the public relations interest of the present age in which world leaders hail the demise of the Cold War and speak of co-operation rather than confrontation as the touchstone of new relations between the Communist and the non-Communist Powers. However, whatever the current state of euphoria in Big Power relations, there would seem to be some merit in recognizing that there is a serious Communist guerrilla movement in Thailand, of nearly a decade-long duration, committed ultimately to the destruction of its lawful government and the violent transformation of its society, and that any meaningful effort to combat that guerrilla movement ought not to begin with conceding one of the more successful psywar and propaganda ploys used by Communists over the years, namely that of making "anti-Communism" or "Communist Suppression" automatically into dirty words. There is, moreover, another reason for CSOC's distinctive name. Under the terms of relevant Thai legislation, in particular the Anti-Communist Act of 1969, the Thai government is charged specifically with "Communist prevention and suppression" activities within the Kingdom, and with reporting such activities to the Thai parliament. CSOC's name, therefore, complies with the language of the 1969 Act and attendant regulations.*

* * * * * * *

**See Editorial Note at end of article*

WHILE a complete history of the Thai insurgency falls outside the scope of these pages, any analysis of CSOC must consider something of the gradual unfolding and intensification of that insurgency, so as to emphasize that the agency emerged not by sudden political fiat but in response to what the Thai government perceived as a steadily increasing threat of foreign-supported domestic subversion. The early origins of the Thai Communist movement in the 1920s reveal significant Chinese influence. Since its official founding (on 1 December 1942), the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has periodically engaged both in covert infiltration and creation of political, trade union, and youth front groups as well as in "revolutionary armed struggle" (formally proclaimed at the Third CPT Congress in 1961), all the while sending cadres to China for indoctrination, and using training facilities in Laos and North Vietnam, and of the Malayan terrorists. (2) CPT fortunes tended to rise and fall with those of the leftist Pridi Phanomyong who briefly had dominated Thai politics after the Second World War. Pridi, having lost out in a power struggle with anti-Communist civilian and military leaders in the later 1940s, has since 1954 been Peking's stalking horse and the front man of various Peking-sponsored, united front, efforts like the "Thailand Independence Movement" of the early 1960s. Since the sixties, also, official Thai concern over infiltration and assistance by the Pathet Lao forces across the border to a developing terrorism and guerrilla insurgency in north-East Thailand has sparked new government security drives.(3)

By this time CPT cadres had begun to develop an underground network of supporters as a base for future mobile guerrilla attacks on Government forces and infiltrations. The first attack occurred on 7 August 1965 at Tambon (township) Renu, in the Amphoe (district) of That Phanom, of Nakhon Phanom Province. A CPT spokesman subsequently boasted that the insurgency in the north-east began when Communist insurgents killed the leader of a police squad "which came to oppress the people". In 1962 a China (or North Vietnam) based clandestine radio transmitter, the "Voice of the People of Thailand" had begun its regular Mao-flavoured broadcasts denouncing the Bangkok government and in the next three years Peking-trained Thai Communists, nominally affiliated with various front organizations like the "Thailand Patriotic Front" and the "Anti-American Movement of Thailand", assumed control over sustained guerrilla operations, as well as over covert Communist recruiting drives backed by terrorism and intimidation in selected villages in the north-east. (4)

Over the years the number of Communist guerrillas, the quantity and sophistication of their weapons, and the influence, if not control, which they exercise over the Thai countryside has grown steadily. By November 1972, the number of insurgents was estimated to have increased by 10 per cent in the previous year, and totalled "7,700 full time armed guerrillas and three or four times that many village supporters". (5) The insurgency, recently described by one authoritative writer as "continual, gradual, worsening", has resulted in the establishment of "Communist organizational control over 150 or more north-east villages and a total population of perhaps 100,000", and although, as Thai government spokesmen have pointed out, there is probably no continuous CPT authority over a sufficiently large number of villages to the extent that one can begin to speak of a Communist "liberated area", even the Bangkok Press, on occasion, has reported, for example, that in the Nakhae district of Nakhon Phanom province some tambons "are under the control of Communist terrorists". (6) In the North there now came clashes with groups of guerrillas, using mortars, rocket grenades, and AK 47 automatic rifles, the type of weapons "one finds in elite North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam", and by January 1973, more than 3,000 Thai troops supported by fighter bombers and heavy artillery were engaged in operations against a 1,000-man guerrilla force in the south, concentrated in the mountains of Trang province. (7) The next month interrogation of three, top ranking, Hanoi-trained, Thai terrorists revealed that the guerrillas were encouraged by the so-called Vietnam ceasefire agreement and had decided upon a protracted campaign to bring the Thai countryside under Communist control within three years. (8)

Meanwhile, the Communist Chinese media continued to trumpet the "new victories" won by the guerrilla "patriotic armed forces", now described as the "people's liberation army", in their "repeated" ambushes of the Thai government "enemy troops". (9) In January 1973, a surrendered insurgent leader, the Meo tribesman

Layoing Sae Lipp, claimed that some 200 Chinese Army troops, specially trained in jungle warfare at Menghai, China, were now in Thailand helping the Thai guerrillas. (10) Whatever the dynamics of the current Sino-American or Soviet-American *rapprochement,* it is abundantly clear that Thailand's insurgent problem, aggravated by Hanoi's continuing campaign of dominance over the rest of Indo-China, and by Peking's persistent support of Communist guerrilla movements throughout South-East Asia, does not appear to be lessening.

* * * * * * *

THE mission and purpose of CSOC have been defined in a number of documents and public statements over the years, and may be summarized as follows:

- to co-ordinate and direct the appropriate units of the Royal Thai armed forces, including Police, as well as certain offices of the ministries of the Royal Thai government, and the provincial and district level co-ordinating units, in a systematic campaign to prevent and combat all forms of Communist insurgency;
- to engage in a number of specific operations in furtherance of the above aim, including use of psychological warfare tactics, control over borders so as to prevent the influx of external assistance to the insurgents, and surveillance of local affairs so as to forestall disruption of normal life by Communists;
- to enhance the general sense of security and well-being of the Thai citizenry, also by promoting and co-ordinating a number of welfare and community-oriented services.

From its inception the main strategic assumption under which CSOC has operated is that the insurgency is not merely a localized contemporary form of the ancient South-East Asian problem of organized dacoity, but rather that it has as its aim the establishment and eventual triumph of a Communist-controlled counter-government in Thailand. Hence CSOC has never been merely concerned with preserving public security, but rather with integrating any security struggle with the promotion and retention of civil loyalty to the existing Thai public and social order.

The CPM concept, i.e. co-operation between civil agencies, military, and police, has therefore been the tactical cornerstone of this concern, and over the years has given birth to two simultaneous techniques which may perhaps be designated as "militarizing the civilians" and "civilianizing the military".

By the former is meant creation of para-military units such as the erstwhile "Volunteer Defence Corps", "People's Assistance Teams" (modelled on the Vietnamese experience) and, in Ubon Province at one time, the "Village Protection Teams". Additionally "Village Security Officers" and so-called "Census Aspiration" personnel (concerned with inquiring into and reporting the grievances and hopes of villagers to the governor's office), could sometimes be considered as a part of this para-militarization process.

Most of these units or personnel categories are no longer operational, their function having been taken over by different organizations with an identical mission. Yet today the 12-man "Village Security Team" (VST), based on the CPM principle that encompasses civilian integration with the police and military in counter-insurgency, remains basic to the whole CSOC function. Led by two skilled police officers, the remainder of the 12-man VST are civilian volunteers. The VSTs, now numbering over 600, are charged with surveillance and security in their immediate rural areas, and operate under the so-called Operations and Co-ordination Centres of their respective Districts. The civilian District Officers have ultimate responsibility for maintaining liaison also in VST operations with the CSOC branches at the provincial level. However, though the provincial CSOC's are headed by the provincial governor who co-ordinates various government services in the counter-insurgency effort, security operations are directed by the regional Army headquarters. Civil and military personnel, in overlapping functions, thus structure the local para-military performance. But actual attacks on the insurgents usually involve units of the armed forces, police, or the Border Patrol Police (a special unit of the national police force).

The "civic action" function of the military has been quite common in South-East Asian countries for more than a decade and Thailand is no exception. "Civilianizing the military" has been one means of identifying soldiers more

closely with villagers through various public projects and welfare services. Perhaps the best known instance of this aspect of Thai counter-insurgency was the Mobile Defence Units (MDU), which began operating in 1962 in the north-east. While quite successful, on the whole, the MDU programme began to be phased out in 1971 and has by now ceased to exist, although Thai military remain extensively involved in technical and development services supervised by other Thai government departments (like the Department of Local Administration in the Interior Ministry) in connexion with the counter-insurgency effort. The MDUs operated directly under the National Security Command headed by the Prime Minister, just as CSOC itself functions under the ultimate supervision of the Prime Minister's Office. The MDU's basic purpose was to win and strengthen the villagers' loyalty for the Thai government through construction projects and social services. Concurrently, the MDUs, divided into smaller Mobile Development Teams and operating from a main and from various "sub-development" base areas in a province, might gather intelligence, as well as engage on rare occasions in counter-guerrilla strikes.

Initially an MDU, as it moved into a changwat (province), for example Nakhon Phanom or Kalasin, numbered about 120 men, mostly construction and special service troops. Later the local unit strength would vary, depending on the programme of activity. In retrospect the MDU's services seem to have been surprisingly wide, ranging from the building of roads, bridges, wells, dams, water storage, schools, libraries and recreational facilities, to distribution of informational materials on national history, government, and culture, as well as on crop improvement and elimination of parasites, and the vaccination and inoculation of humans and livestock. The average length of stay of an MDU in a given area was about six to eight months, and from the start close co-operation between MDU commanders and local civil officials was envisaged.

Though the MDU concept had its critics, especially among foreign observers ("hit and run development programmes never win lasting friends", as one American AID—Agency for International Development—official put it to me) there is little question that the programme, on balance, was quite beneficial, particularly if viewed from the psychological "civic action" perspective. After all, when one confronts a well organized Communist insurgency situation there is perhaps no greater danger than that of the growth of alienation between government security forces and the local civilian population. To foster such alienation is a major insurgent aim, to prevent it is the objective of "civic action", and while it would be premature to assess now the effects of the MDU on the whole insurgency problem in Thailand one can say that the MDU programme contributed to preventing in the Kingdom the kind of conspicuous estrangement in relations between government, military and the citizenry which existed, for example, in China during the 1940s, or in Cambodia in the past year. The gradual abandonment of the MDU concept appears to have been related in part to one of the persistent problems that runs through the whole Thai counter-insurgency experience, and that is how to balance and accommodate different (and frequently jealous) government departments and services in a joint action programme. Simply, the role of the military in rural development as performed by the MDU tended to overlap that of other government services in a changwat.

* * * * * * *

ESPECIALLY since 1969 a greater effort has been made to define the role of various Royal Thai government services as co-operating but distinctive units in the counter-insurgency programme, providing co-ordination from the top, so to speak through the CSOC command structure at the national headquarters, as well as at the provincial and district levels.

On the one hand, this has meant increasing reliance on the provincial CSOCs which, headed by the provincial governors, implement the CPM (civilian, police, military) concept by bringing to bear in each changwat the technical and welfare services of the Thai government apparatus, whether military or civilian. At the amphoe (district level) similar command co-ordination is attempted through the previously named District Operations and Co-ordination Centres headed by the district officers who supervise the "rice roots" operations of the "Village Security Teams" (see above). On the other hand, co-ordination from the top has tended to en-

courage the ministries and departments of the Royal Thai Government to develop agencies and services that can be specifically related to a counter-insurgency programme. Of necessity the divisions of the Ministry of Interior have been particularly involved in this development, but they have by no means been the only ones. Thus, over the years, the Interior Ministry elaborated on its Community Development Office specifically in conjunction with the government's overall counter-insurgency effort (providing training for village leaders, as well as construction of public facilities), initiated a rather short-lived "Developing Democracy Programme", (political education of the villagers), expanded the scope of the Border Patrol Police (the Thai National Police Department falls under the Ministry of Interior), and of other police and surveillance functions, and so on. The Prime Minister's Office, however, developed the so-called "Accelerated Rural Development" programme (concerned with improving water supplies, cleaning of land and other services to farmers), the Ministry of Public Health expanded its concern with rural health centres, the anti-malaria drive and potable water projects, while yet other government departments have concentrated on development of electric power, irrigation facilities, farmers' co-operatives, and so on.

No doubt motivated in large part by the intent of making the counter-insurgency effort a truly national one, involving the whole panoply of government services, (as well as by sensitivity to bureaucratic jealousy), this particular kind of counter-insurgency structuring process has produced needless functional overlapping and a plethora of official agencies probably in excess of the limited resources that could be expended by the government. It is here that we touch on what is perhaps the greatest weakness of the Thai counter-insurgency programme, i.e. in the words of one recent report, the spawning of "a bewildering range of counter-insurgency group teams and units, all neatly tagged and initialled in the American style."(11)

A few examples, from past and present, may perhaps suffice. Most specialists on counter-insurgency are agreed on the priority of creating a viable, "rice-roots" paramilitary force, so as to (1) heighten direct village involvement in the peasant's own security, and (2) supplement the intelligence gathering and tactical operations of regular military and police. Of all dimensions of effective counter-insurgency, none can be said to exceed the importance of developing the prestige and continuity of the local para-military force. A glance at the Thai experience, however, suggests that this principle has unfortunately not always been applied with the consistency it deserves; indeed, it is difficult to resist the notion that today the village para-military are the stepchild of the Thai counter-insurgency operation. There have been constant administrative and leadership changes over the years in the para-military organizational structure: among the precedessors of the VSTs today there have been such groups as the Village Protection Teams, Village Security Force, People's Assistance Teams, and the Volunteer Defence Corps (which at one point, in the later 'sixties had some 4,000 men under arms in more than 200 villages), not to mention the special para-military volunteer groups organized by a few District Operations and Co-ordination Centres as the need arose.

In the past some volunteer forces were paid; VST personnel today are not. Some local Army commanders and provincial governors have encouraged the para-military concept; others have not. Since so much of the CSOC operation, whether at the national or the changwat and amphoe levels, is of a co-ordinating nature, the agency, by itself, is obviously limited in intervening effectively and directly in VST organization and operations. As the Thai government has increasingly recognized the urgency of the terrorist problem so an overhaul of the structure of its para-military force requires priority attention.

In Thailand's counter-insurgency organizational web the spinning of ever-new bureaucratic enclaves has, then, been an abiding problem. Some of the bureaucratic entities demonstrated their worth (like the Accelerated Rural Development programme and its co-ordinating committee structure, or some of the psywar services developed directly by CSOC), even though they were subsequently superseded by a new organizational structure. But other bodies, still extant, leave one with unanswered questions.

Accumulation and swift dissemination of intelligence is critical to effective counter-insurgency, and this principle is of course well

understood throughout the Thai programme. But looking at the present imposing intelligence system in the broad CSOC operational context — from the Intelligence Division in the Operations and Co-ordinating Centre at CSOC headquarters, through the same headquarters' Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Intelligence Section of the CSOC Interrogation Centre, the intelligence units of the three regional Army Area headquarters and of the Fifth Military Circle, the Technical Air Intelligence service of the Direct Air Support Centres (DASC) of the Army Area Forwards, the Joint Security Centre whose intelligency functions also come under cognizant regional Army headquarters, and onwards to such incidental or directed intelligence functions performed at the changwat and amphoe CSOC levels and by the Border Police — all this makes one wonder a little just how well, in fact, its many operational layers can reasonably by expected to function.

* * * *

THE history of CSCO suggests that in its first two years, when the insurgency problem was not as severe, the agency probably had a good deal more initiating and direct control over in-the-field counter-insurgency operations than is the case today. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the circumstance that the CSOC Commander then was concurrently also the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and the Army's Commander-in-Chief, and that his deputies represented the National Police Department, and the Interior and Defence Ministries. As the CSOC command structure solidified, the problem of its relationship with the Army became ever more acute. Nominally, CSOC, at this time, had control over Army operations in a counter-insurgency context; in reality such control never functioned well, not least because of certain rivalries and because CSOC found it different to call on needed logistical assistance from the rest of the Army for such Army units as functioned under its supervision. CSOC, under the circumstances, would either have had to develop its own complete "Army" organization — precarious political move — or a new arrangement with the Royal Thai armed forces establishment would have to be worked out. A decision was made in the course of 1967 in favour, essentially, of the latter choice. By October of that year actual military operations against the insurgents in the northeastern part of the country were formally left with the Second Army, and by the end of 1967 anti-guerrilla action in the North became the responsibility of the Third Army. These changes (formalized, as has been indicated at the beginning of this paper, by the alteration of CSOC's name to "Communist Prevention and Suppression Directorate") made CSOC essentially a co-ordinating and planning agency with the Royal Thai Army acting as an autonomous but co-operating operational arm insofar as counter-insurgency is concerned.

In view of the heavy preponderance of Army personnel in the CSOC command structure, the functional changes made in CSOC since 1967 may seem at first blush to have meant little. But unquestionably these changes did leave CSOC increasingly at the mercy of Army commanders as well as the participating personnel of the civil administration and of other government departments. One need not necessarily be influenced by guarded references by qualified observers that in this particular province a governor actively encourages CSOC, while his colleague, in an adjacent province, is much less enthusiastic, nor by the self-serving remarks of CSOC personnel that the agency "needs more authority"(12), to conclude that along with the problems posed by the multiplicity of other bureaucratic services concerned with counter-insurgency CSOC's lack of independent operational power, on occasion, probably tends to make it a good deal less effective than it might and should be.

* * * *

MEANWHILE, in its co-ordinating role, CSOC has been spinning out a number of "operational concepts" and broad tactical plans, dealing with improvements in village security, integration of the vulnerable hilltribes, reorganization of local administration, and so on. It is difficult to determine whether these plans, or any aspect of them, which are after all part of one of the agency's major implicit functions, have been seriously considered or implemented by other branches of the Thai government. On the other hand, the data amassed by CSOC on Communist insurgent recruitment tactics over

the years remains invaluable and has been readily available to other cognizant government services. These data have stressed the cautious, deliberate, and gradually expanding methods of the insurgents' contact with and influence over their village targets. Because of the significance of these data, the accumulation of which has been a significant function of CSOC, they may perhaps be briefly described here.

Beginning with seemingly inoccuous visits of Communist cadres to village relatives or friends, sometimes to perform useful functions as peddlers or skilled healers, then again to settle permanently as farmers or craftsmen, the target village becomes subject to a steady, low key, propagandizing campaign, focussed on a variety of subjects, such as the plight of the poorer peasants or tenants, and of the young, due to alleged government neglect. Sometimes even a prominent local personage or two is won over who can lend prestige to the cadres' politicization effort. The fruit of this campaign is expected to become evident in two ways: firstly in the recruitment of (usually young) neophytes who are then sent to camps in Communist-controlled Laos, North Vietnam, or even China, for further training, subsequently to return as organizers or guerrillas for the Communist cause, and secondly, in the development, within the village, tambon, or amphoe, of cell-like "Progressive Masses" and similar front organizations, directed by seasoned cadres. The final step is the formation of a village CPT committee, which begins to function, in effect, as a counter-government, and which becomes responsible for systematic guerrilla activity, intimidation, taxation, and so on.

A pamphlet recently published by the South East Asia Treaty Organization, and distributed by it and CSOC, contains the autobiography of Bunkong Toemsuk, a peasant from Ubon province who, wishing to become a doctor, was enticed through a party cadre to leave his village to go to North Vietnam in hopes of getting medical training, but instead was put in a camp for future guerrilla fighters and, having become disillusioned, subsequently surrendered to government authorities upon his return to Thailand.(13) Bunkong Toemsuk's story parallels that of other Thai who were recruited by the Communists and who were also sent for training in North Vietnam, Laos, or China (see again the Thai government's "White Book" on Communist insurgency, cited in note 2 above) and it focusses attention on CSOC operations with respect to Communist defectors and prisoners.

The CSOC Interrogation Centre, headed by a senior official of the Special Branch (Political) of the Criminal Investigation Department of the national police, appears to have a principal, though not exclusive, responsibility for questioning defectors and prisoners, and for disseminating information that has been gathered to other agencies. In general, co-operative defectors and prisoners (and there appear to be few that are not!) can count on leniency and a good chance at rehabilitation. But considering the relative frequency of defection and of instances of rehabilitation, it is surprising to see how little use is actually made of recanting and penitent former insurgents in the local propaganda or psywar campaigns of CSOC-directed or affiliated agencies. Instances, for example, in which defectors have been taken on tour through village areas to tell their story, and to answer questions, or in which they have participated in specific psywar operations, are not as regular and numerous as they deserve to be. The reasons are not altogether clear, but, again, jurisdictional rivalry and overlapping of the different government agencies involved in the whole Thai counter-insurgency effort appear to be major factors.

** * * * * *

BY the middle of 1973 the wide-ranging, insurgent units in Thailand, greatly buoyed by the advance of Communist forces in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia during the previous months, appeared to be moving toward still greater organizational consolidation in a single *Tap Plod Ak Prathet Thai* ("Thai Liberation Army"). This development seemed to run parallel to CPT attempts to create a more or less cohesive counter or "shadow" government in sections of the north-east. (14) It is easy to dismiss CPT claims of the scope of this Communist counter-government as greatly exaggerated. In the north and north-east, with frequent military patrolling, close attention to strangers that appear in villages, improvement in government public services in previously neglected regions, the hold which such a local Communist

"counter-government" can have, seems tenuous indeed. The fact remains, however,that despite its (present!) weakness the mere appearance of a co-ordinated CPT "counter-government" marks a significant new level of operations in the Thai insurgency—it would not have been thought of five, or even three years ago.

The structure of this "counter-government" clearly is an extension of that at the village level which earlier CSOC reports on Communist recruitment and organizational development had revealed. Thus, beyond the village CPT committee, there have now been developed amphoe and changwat level party committees, with their own executive secretaries and other Party officials charged with agitation and propaganda, liaison with the "Liberation" forces, and so on. The Party committees particularly have co-ordinating responsibilities in two fields. The first field comprises the "Progressive Masses", "Patriotic", and other front organizations, the establishment of which (as has been described) was, and is, a major initial cadre effort at the village level, but the expansion of which, through district and provincial level fronts, is now being implemented by the CPT. The second field is the systematization and control over the "Liberation Army", from the village level and its Communist "Village Defence" force *(Noi Tahan Prajam Ban–Norjobol)* on up to district and province level units. Among the latter are the floating Communist militia *(Noi Tahan Prajam Thin–Norpatol)* operating independently of or, as occasion demands, in conjunction with the *Norjobol.*

Today the Thai insurgency is clearly—to use Chinese Communist parlance—"walking on two legs". This means that the CPT is developing a formal, well disciplined and well armed *military* arm, increasingly capable of fighting set-piece battles (as in the case of previously mentioned operations in Trang province, in January 1973, when more than 3,000 Thai troops, supported by fighter bombers and artillery battled some 1,000 Communists) (15) as well as a *civilian* infrastructure composed of Party front group complexes in various areas. Gradually, CSOC and other government operations against the insurgents, which now are still identified by geographically distinct sections—the North, the North-East, and the South—will require greater co-ordination as "Liberation Army" units themselves begin to link up and tactically co-ordinate their activities to a growing degree. The long-term perspective of the "walking on two legs" strategy had already been revealed by the CSOC on 20 February 1973, as a Communist attempt to take over the Thai countryside within three years by means of a campaign that will place increasing emphasis on propaganda and indoctrination and that will make use of the so-called cease-fire agreement on Vietnam. (16)

The time element (three years) is significant: particularly in the new climate of Big Power relations following President Nixon's diplomatic initiatives the time factor in the CPT take-over programme is obviously designed not only to soothe possible apprehensions among Thai allies,like the U.S., and capitalize on an expected growing American desire for international disengagement, but it is also directed toward the emergence of an anticipated, more accommodating attitude toward People's China and Communism generally in Thailand itself. Considering, too, the current restiveness in Thai student circles—a standard and easily exploited source of radicalizing influence in society-and its implications for domestic politics in the future*, then the question arises just how Thai decision-makers today conceive of the future of their nation's counter-insurgency programme. When one views individual elements or correlated features of that programme, e.g. the resettlement of the Northern hilltribes, or the rural development programme in the North-East, or the efforts to integrate alienated Thai Muslims in the South, successes can be relatively easily pinpointed. The number of roads built, of wells dug, of co-operatives established, of new settlers now cultivating once virgin land, of schools and clinics opened, of Muslims incorporated in government services, of psywar leaflets distributed, of terrorists killed, captured or surrendered, of villages reclaimed from CPT control—all these and more can give a promising, quantitatively based, prognosis of the Thai Communist problem.

**This article was completed before student demonstrations on 14-15 October 1973 forced the resignation of the Government of Field Marshal Thanom Kittakachorn and his exile and that the Deputy Prime Minister and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn. The effective participation of students within Thai domestic politics, however, by no means invalidates the argument that some student circles could be prey to exploitation (17) (Ed.).*

But there are unsolved imponderables that go beyond evaluating the proper means of, say, integrating the Northern Meos in the agriculture of the border provinces, or of preventing technical improvements in the north-east from benefiting mainly the rich producers. (18) These imponderables have to do with the overall perception by the Thai government of the insurgency's role in foreign relations, specifically as regards People's China and North Vietnam, with the rivalry and dysfunctions between bureaucratic and other interest groups in the Thai polity (19), not to mention the pressure from influential families and the religious establishment in relation to them, and with the resources that can be allocated both in terms of manpower and treasure to a sustained counter-insurgency campaign. Despite all its experience and organizational innovating there remains something unfinished, something not wholly committed, about the present Thai counter-insurgency effort. In view of the widening terrorist problem in Thailand today, and its international regional implications, one must hope that more complete commitment to the eradication of the problem will not be too long delayed.

Editorial note: **Bangkok Post** *reported on 23 September 1973 that the then Thai Government was drafting a comprehensive internal security law to replace the Anti-Communist Act of 1969 and amend laws governing association, the Press, schools and labour. The newspaper's Editor-in-Chief, Theh Chongkhadikij, wrote that CSOS "is considered a ready-made institution" to ensure internal security under the new law. It might be expanded, he wrote, "to handle all types of armed violence in addition to the Communist insurgency" and to approach "the triple problem of bad officials, poverty and Communist activity..... with a package solution".*

Notes and References

1. The Thai term to designate CSOC is *Kong Amnuaykarn Pongkan Prabpram Communist*, perhaps best translated as "Organization for the Prevention and Suppression of Communism".
2. See the Thai government's "White Book", *Communist Insurgency in Thailand* (Prepared by Communist Suppression Operations Command, 1973, Bangkok), pp. 1-5, and summarized in *South-East Asian Spectrum* (July 1973).
3. Donald E. Weatherbee, *The United Front in Thailand*, (University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., 1970) pp. 20-27.
4. *The Communist Threat to Thailand* (SEATO Short Paper, No. 44, Bangkok, 1967) especially pp. 14-25, 27; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Peking, Hanoi, and Guerilla Insurgency in Southeast Asia", *Southeast Asian Perspectives*, September, 1971, pp. 12-14; *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, California, 1967), p. 386, and *Communist Insurgency in Thailand, op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.
5. *New York Times*, 27 November 1972.
6. "Reds Control 2 tambons in Nakhon Phanom", *Bangkok World*, 23 May 1973, "19 Tak villagers 'no go' to Govt," *Bangkok Post*, 30 September 1973, and David Morell, "Thailand", *Asian Survey*, February, 1973, p. 170.
7. John T. Wheeler in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 January 1969, and Reuter's despatch, Bangkok, 18 January 1973.
8. *Asia Research Bulletin*, 1-28 February 1973, p. 1629.
9. *Peking Review*, 16 March 1973, p. 19.
10. Reuter's despatch, Bangkok, 19 January 1973.
11. David Jenkins, "Changing Tune", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 March 1973, p. 27.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Bunkong Toemsuk, *Why I Left the Terrorists* (Published by SEATO, Bangkok).
14. David Jenkins, "The Hit-Run 'Government'", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 July 1973, p. 26. I have drawn on this informative article as well as on other sources in my description of Communist "shadow" government operations.
15. With more sustained operations casualties will mount. On 4 May 1973 the Malaysian national news agency *Bernama* reported from Bangkok that during operations against the terrorists, ending 27 April, Thai government forces had "suffered the biggest loss in the history of terrorist suppression" in a single week (16 killed and 25 wounded).
16. *Asia Research Bulletin*, 1-28 February 1973, p. 1629.
17. On the upsurge of student violence in Thailand see, e.g. Jeff Romm, *Urbanisation in Thailand* (International Urbanization Survey, The Ford Foundation, 1972) p. 94.
18. See Hans U. Luther, "Thailand-Counterinsurgency or Rural Development", *Asia Research Bulletin*, 1-31 October 1972, p. 1296.
19. A recent example of such bureaucratic conflict delaying the counter-insurgency effort was the government's Forestry Department's recent clash with CSOC over conversion of forest reserve lands into hilltribe settlement areas in Tak province. For the success of CSOC's programme here expansion of settlement areas seems essential. See *Bangkok Post*, 28 May 1973.

Notes on Contributors

Dennis J. Duncanson is Reader in South-East Asian Studies at the University of Kent, England. Between 1946 and 1957 he was a member of the Malayan Civil Service, holding the post of Commissioner for Labour in the Government of Singapore and various other Chinese affairs posts, and from 1957 to 1961 he was Deputy Director of Information Services in the Government of Hong Kong. He served in Vietnam, 1961-66, firstly on the British Advisory Administrative Mission and later as Counsellor (Aid) at the British Embassy in Saigon. He has contributed many articles to journals and newspapers and has written **Government and Revolution in Vietnam** (Oxford University Press, London, 1968).

George G. Thomson is a Professor in the Department of Government and Administration, Nanyang University, Singapore. During the Second World War he was on the Intelligence Staff of Lord Mountbatten at South-East Asia Command and has served in the Singapore Government Service since 1945, holding, in recent years, the posts of Director of the Political Study Centre of the Singapore Civil Service and Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Geoffrey Fairbairn lectures on Revolts and Insurgencies at the Australian National University in Canberra. He has visited the Arakan and Shan States of Burma, Laos, Vietnam, North-East Thailand, Malaya, Israel and Northern Ireland to observe revolutionary/guerrilla warfare, and is a founding Council Member of the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict. Publications include **Revolutionary Warfare and Communist Strategy** (Faber and Faber, London, 1966) and **Guerrilla Warfare in the Modern World** (to be published by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, April 1972) as well as numerous articles for journals and newspapers. He is currently working on **A Handbook of Guerrilla Warfare.**

Goh Cheng Teik is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. During the 1973-74 Academic Year he is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, England. He is author of **The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia** (Oxford University Press, London, 1971) and of **Malaysia's Changing China Policy** (to be published shortly).

Justus van der Kroef is Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Bridgeport, Connecticut, U.S.A. He has written many monographs and books on South-East Asia, including the recent **Indonesia since Sukarno** (Asia-Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971).